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Sulh is a mechanism for dispute settlement in the Hanafi and Ottoman law. This 
study aims to explore this concept through three fatwa compilations of eighteenth-
century şeyhülislams, namely Behcetü'l-fetâvâ ma‘a’n-nukûl, Fetava-yı Abdurrahim and 
Neticet’ül-fetâvâ me‘an-nukul. It has been tried to situate the concept of sulh in the 
broader picture of the Ottoman law. It will be argued that sulh has been a practice 
through which the individuals can behave as courts. In other words, the disputants can 
settle their disputes based on very well-defined legal principles. This makes sulh 
different from mere negotiation or mediation in which the disputants are crucial in 
setting the regulations of the process of the dispute settlement. Furthermore, it will be 
also argued that while the legal opinions of the eighteenth-century Ottoman jurists are 
very consistent, they are not in total agreement with the pre-Ottoman and earlier 
Ottoman jurists. This further observation seems to have implications for the broader 
debates on the ‘closure of the gate of ictihâd’ as well as homogeneity and integration in 
the Ottoman law of the eighteenth century.        
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ÖZET 
 
 
ONSEKIZINCI YÜZYIL OSMANLI FETVA MECMULARINDA SULH 
 
 
M. Hadi Hosainy 
 
Yüksek Lisans, Tarih 
 
 
Tez Danışmanı: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Hülya Canbakal 
 
 
Sulh; Fetva; Şeyhülislam; İslam Hukuk; Uyuşmazlık Çözümü; Arabuluculuk; Müzakere; 
Fetva Mecmuası; Oryantalizm 
 
 
 
Sulh kavramı Hanefi/Osmanlı hukukunda bir uyuşmazlık çözümü 
mekanizmasına işaret eder. Bu çalışma bu kavramı, Behcetü'l-fetâvâ ma‘a’n-nukûl, 
Fetava-yı Abdurrahim ve Neticet’ül-fetâvâ me‘an-nukul olmak üzere üç 18. yy. 
şeyhülislam mecmuası ışığında incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu çerçevede sulh 
kavramının Osmanlı hukukundaki yeri belirlenmeye çalışılmış, ve sulhun bireylerin 
mahkeme gibi hareket etmlerine olanak sağladığı iddia edilmiştir. Başka bir deyimle, 
dava tarafları kendi uyuşmazlıklarını çok iyi tanımlanmış prensipler çerçevesinde 
çözebilmektedirler. Sulhun bu özelliği ise onu, dava taraflarının uyuşmazlık çözümü 
sürecindeki kuralları belirlemede önemli rol aynadıkları müzakere ve arabuluculuktan 
ayırmaktadır. Bununla birlikte, 18. yy. şeyhülislamlarının hukukî  görüşlerinin 
birbirileriyle çok tutarlılık arz etmesiyle birlikte, onların Osmanlı öncesi ve daha erken 
Osmanlı hukukçularıyla tamamen aynı görüşü paylaşmadıkları da gözlemlenmiştir. Bu 
ise ‘ictihâd kapısının kapanması’ ve 18. yy. Osmanlı hukukundaki homojenleşme ve 
bütünleşme gibi daha genel tartışmalar için değerlendirilmesi faydalı bir gözlemdir. 
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A Note on Transliteration: 
  
The transliteration used for Ottoman Turkish in this study follows the usage in Mehmet 
Erdoğan’s Hukuk ve Fıkıh Terimleri Sözlüğü. For example, şeyhülislam is preferred to 
shaykh’ul-islâm, and ictihâd to ijtihâd. The words that have entered English lxicons 
have been used without transliteration, such as fatwa, mufti, and sharia. Arab authors 
and Arabic book titles have been given in a reader-friendly manner. For example H is 
used for both ( ) and ( ) and S is used for ( ), ( ), and ( ). 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
The concept of sulh refers to a contract that settles disputes among the individuals. 
This is an option laid in front of individuals by the Islamic/Ottoman law, so that they 
can resolve the extant disputes among them without recourse to court. A detailed 
account regarding the principles related to this way of settlement is given in Ottoman 
legal texts parallel to the earlier Hanafi texts. This study aims to shed light on this 
mechanism of dispute settlement through the fatwa compilations that belong to three 
eighteenth-century şeyhülislams and a legal manual fürû‘-ı fıkh by the sixteenth-century 
jurist Halebi.             
It will be demonstrated, in the first chapter, that while the Ottoman jurists allowed 
individuals to choose extra-judicial mechanisms to settle their disputes, they also 
established legal norms, defining the related stipulations and principles in meticulous 
detail. This finding has significant implications for the place of Ottoman law in the 
debates about Islamic law and conflict resolution. This thesis argues that sulh is not an 
Islamic version of alternative dispute settlement (ADR), i.e. sulh is not a mere process 
of negotiation or mediation totally outside the formal legal process. It does not, 
however, suggest that Islamic law is quite similar to the court-based, rational formalistic 
legal system of the modern West.  
Property relations among individuals are considered in Islamic law as part of the 
category of „claims of men‟. What are considered in modern law as the law of contracts, 
law of family and divorce, law of inheritance, as well as some parts of the penal law, all 
fall in this category of claims. When disputes arise in this domain, state does not take 
any action without the complaint of the individuals involved. Law places the individual, 
whose complaint or consent is vital to commence a legal process, at the center of legal 
activities. However, once a complaint is placed, Islamic law is quite sensitive in 
handling scrupulously the mutual rights and obligations of individuals. For example, if a 
person is injured by another, the perpetrator is not punished unless there is a complaint 
2 
 
on the part of the injured. Once a complaint is placed, the court has to follow a fixed the 
procedure in order to establish „justice‟. 
Whatever falls in the category of the„claims of men‟ can be subject to settlement 
as well. Therefore, it would not be farfetched to claim that a study of sulh also 
delineates a general picture of the Islamic private law. Furthermore, the general attitude 
of Islamic law towards the domain of the „claims of men‟ is reflected in sulh as well 
though in the sulh process individuals themselves take on the function of the court. 
Thus, sulh requires the presence of a plaintiff who makes a claim against a defendant. 
The two disputing parties make a settlement contract, which should be totally in line 
with the relevant principles in Islamic law. This contract is legal
1
 and binding, as is the 
case with the decision made by the court. 
Sulh emerges also as an intermediate institution that balances the ambition of 
Islamic jurists to cover nearly all aspects of individual activities on the one hand and the 
limits of judicial practice, on the other. Sulh lightens the burden of the court because 
individuals take on its function; but at the same, the strictly defined conditions and 
processes of sulh demonstrate that Islamic jurists tends not to make any concessions on 
their totalistic attitude. That is why it is assumed that sulh must have been practiced 
more frequently than it appears in the court registers. This is one reason that makes the 
study of the fatwa compilations on this issue more relevant.  
The Ottoman practice of sulh is studied in the second chapter, which explores and 
tries to explain the fatwas available in the relevant chapters of the şeyhülislam 
compilations. The chapter argues that Ottoman şeyhülislams of the eighteenth century 
further emphasized individual rights and obligations compared to earlier Ottoman and 
pre-Ottoman jurists. Furthermore, some signs of further legal homogenization in the 
eighteenth century are pointed out as they appear in the fatwa compilations.   
                                                 
1
 The term “legal” here does not merely refer to“machinery for settling disputes and a 
moral obligation to conclude them sooner or later,” but to a body of principles enforced 
by political authority. For a distinction of these two meanings of law, see Richard Abel, 
“A Comparative Theory of Dispute Institutions in Society,” Law & Society Review, 8 
(2), Winter, 1974, pp. 221-224.   
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The fatwa compilations form a significant part of the legal literature, which are 
very useful to track the evolution of legal principles over time.
2
 Tracing this evolution is 
a secondary but consistent concern of this study and touched upon in both chapters. The 
relationship between the legal principles put forward by the Ottoman law and by earlier 
Hanafi jurists. The main source for the pre-Ottoman Hanafi jurists has been the 
secondary literature in Turkish and English. In this context, not only the question of 
„continuity‟ versus „change‟ will be explored, but also the possible implications of the 
findings in the Ottoman context will be examined.  
 
 
 
A. Fatwa in Hanafi School: 
 
 
 
The compilations under study belong to şeyhülislams of the eighteenth century. 
This legal genre existed since the early period of Islamic history and continued with 
increasing significance through the post-classical era, including the Ottoman period. 
Fatwa is defined as the response given by a fakîh, one who is learned in Islamic 
canonical jurisprudence, which does not have the meaning of hukm (legal decision that 
is binding). A fakîh who issues fatwas is called mufti. The question posed to the fakîh 
for a fatwa is called istifta and the questioner is named müstefti.3    
The source of sharia, or Islamic law, theoretically is totally divine; God is the 
ultimate source. Quran is directly his words, given to Muhammad through revelation. 
Muhammad, both as the conveyer of the divine message and its interpreter, was a 
secondary source. In the following centuries, however, fıkh started to develop, using 
Quran and hadîs as well as kıyas (legal analogy) and icmâ‘4 (consensus among the 
founding Islamic community) as sources.
 5
  
                                                 
2
 See Baber Johansen, “Legal Literature and the Problem of Change: The Case of Land 
Rent,” in his (ed.) Contingency in a Sacred Law: Law and Ethical Norms in the Muslim 
Fiqh, (Leiden, Boston, Köln: Brill, 1999), pp.447-453. 
3
 Ebül‟ula Mardin, “Fetvâ,” İslam DİA, IV. p. 583; Fahrettin Atar “Fetva” DİA, XII. p. 
489; J.R. Walsh, “Fatwâ,” EI2,  IX, pp. 866-867.   
4
 Mardin, “Fetvâ,” p. 583.  
5
 There is a whole discussion on the beginning of fıkh that was started with Schacht who 
claims in his An Introduction to Islamic Law, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), that al-
Shafii was the founder of Islamic legal theory (pp. 37-48). The position has been 
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The relation between fatwa and ictihâd is a complicated one. A jurist who can 
deduce a legal opinion based on these four sources is called müctehîd.6 A fatwa issued 
can be either ictihâd or mere imitation (taklîd) of earlier jurists‟ legal opinions. Issue of 
ictihâd is a controversial one as well. While the earlier works of scholars such as 
Schacht and Coulson argue for the “closure of the gate of ictihâd” in the post-classical 
era, this view has been revised in relatively recent studies in the Islamic law.
7
 The 
information in the Ottoman texts support the continuation of ictihâd in the post-classical 
era as well.
8
     
In the Islamic legal tradition, there is another important institution, that of kazâ 
(judgment). A kadı (judge) makes decisions on legal disputes as well as a mufti. Kazâ is 
different from iftâ. A comparison between the two institutions of kaza and iftâ will be 
helpful especially in understanding the latter: 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                        
repudiated by recent works such as those of Hallaq‟s. For example, see W. Hallaq “Was 
al-Shafi„i the Master Architect of Islamic Jurisprudence?”International Journal of 
Middle Eastern Studies 25, 1993, where he argues and convincingly shows that it was in 
the 10
th
 century that Islamic legal theory was established.       
6
 Wael Hallaq defines ictihâd as “the maximum effort expended by the jurist to master 
and apply the principles and rules of usûl al-fiqh (legal theory) for the purpose of 
discovering God‟s law.” “Was the Gate of Ijtihad Closed?” International Journal of 
Middle East Studies, 16 (1), 1984, p.3.  
7
 Hallaq, “Was the Gate of Ijtihad Closed?”; Johansen, “Legal Literature.”  
8
 R.C.  Repp notes that Ebu‟s-su„ûud was known by his contemporaries as a follower of 
the tradition of “ra’y” (ictihâd). The Mufti of Istanbul, (Oxford Oriental Institute 
Monographs-Ithaca Press, 1986), p.282. Ebu‟s-su„ûd‟s fatwa on the permissibility of 
cash waqf is a case of ictihâd, which is based, according to İnalcık, on public welfare 
(istislâh), which is an additional source in the Hanafi legal theory. “Kânun and the 
Shariah,” 1987, p.4, cited in Ali Yaycıoğlu, “Ottoman Fatwâ: An Essay on Legal 
Consultation in the Ottoman Empire,” Unpublished Master‟s Thesis, Bilkent University, 
1997, p.25. For further information on istislâh see Şükrü Özen, “İstislâh,” DİA, XXIII. 
pp.383.388. 
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Table 1: The comparison between iftâ and kazâ 
 İftâ Kazâ 
 Restrictions  Mufti: Should be Muslim 
Judge: Should be 
Muslim, male, and free
9
 
The way question raised  By an individual By adversarial parties
10
  
Enforcement of the decision Not binding  Binding
11
  
The subject matter 
Both worldly affairs and those 
related to worship and ritual 
Merely worldly affairs 
between people
12
  
Universe of the validity of the 
decision 
All the Muslims all over the time 
Merely the applicants 
involved in the case
13
 
Method 
Mufti finds the rulings through 
general principles  
Kadı applies the rulings 
to cases
14
  
 
Considering legal practice, there is a difference between a judge‟s decision and a 
mufti‟s fatwa. Court registers are an appropriate source for invistegating the legal 
practice, since the decisions of the judges were binding. The fatwas, on the other hand, 
formed the theoretical bases of law, formulating the legal principles in an abstract 
language, applicable universally to all Muslims and for all the times. However, it is not 
to say that fatwas are totally useless for researches on legal practice. Fatwas were 
mainly issued upon real cases,
15
 giving information about the legal concerns of a certain 
                                                 
9
 Mohammed Fadel, “Two Women, One Man: Knowledge, Power, and Gender in 
Medieval Sunni Legal Thought,” IJMES, 2 (2), 1997, pp.189-190. 
10
 M.K. Masud, B. Messick, and D.S. Powers, “Muftis, fatwas, and Islamic legal 
interpretation,” in Muhammed Khalid Masud, Brinkely Messick, and David S. Powers 
(ed.s) Islamic Legal Interpretation: Muftis and their Fatwas, (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, London: Harvard University Press, 1996,) p. 18; B. Messick, “The 
Mufti, the Text and the World: Legal Interpretation in Yemen,” 21 (1), 1986, p.103.   
11
 Messick, “The Mufti, the Text and the World,” p.103; Fahrattin Atar, “Fetva,” p. 488; 
Masud, Messick, and Powers “Muftis,” p.18.  
12
 Fahrattin Atar, “Fetva,” p.488; Kevin A. Reinhart, “Transcendence and Social 
Practice: Muftis and Qadis as Social Interpretors,” Annales Islamologiques, 1994, 27, 
pp.14-16. 
13
 Wael Hallaq, “From Fatwâs to Furû‘: Growth and Change in the Islamic Substantive 
Law,” Islamic Law and Society, 1994, 1 (1), p. 34; Fahrattin Atar, “Fetva,” p.488; 
Masud, Messick, and Powers “Muftis,” p.18. 
14
 Ebül‟ula Mardin, “Fetvâ,” p.583. 
15
 Hallaq, “From Fatwâs to Furû‘,” pp.37-38. 
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historical time and space. Furthermore, fatwas formed an alternative arena for the 
settlement of disputes.
16
           
 
 
 
B. Fatwas in Ottoman Law: 
 
 
 
In the Ottoman polity, the office of şeyhülislam (i.e. meşihat) was established in 
the 15th century.
17
 The title of şeyhülislam was attributed to the mufti of Istanbul. In 
time, this title paved the way towards further bureaucratization. During the reign of 
Kanuni Sultan Süleyman, a large department, fetvâhâne, was associated with the office 
under an officer, fetvâ emîni.18  
The desclining nature of the qualifications of the muftis, i.e. the decrease in the 
qualification sought in muftis, who previously had to be absolute muctehid, is observed 
by Wael Hallaq as a sign of flexibility in the legal theory to establish “a balance 
between the demands of religious idealism and the exigencies of reality.”19 Such 
balance was established in the Ottoman Empire via further bureaucratization of the 
meşihat, which made it possible to respond to the increasing number of queries in a 
more efficient way. It was as a corollary of this bureaucratization that Ebu‟s-su„ûd 
presumably issued 1412 fatwas in one day, and 1413 in another day.
20
         
                                                 
16
 M. Akif Aydın, İslam-Osmanlı Aile Hukuku, (İstanbul: Marmara Üniversitesi, 1985, 
p.77). 
17
 R.C. Repp, “Shaykh al-Islam,” EI2, p.400.  
18
 Now, the procedure worked as following: The applicant (müstefti) inquires to the 
office for a fatwa. Draftsman (müsveddeci) formulated the query of the applicant. The 
draft went to the fetvâ emîni. If emîn approved the query (istiftâ), then the copyst 
(mübeyyiz) produced a fair copy of the query, which was submitted to the şeyhülislam. 
He wrote his ruling and signed it. Then the fatwa was collated by a collator 
(mukabeleci) and handed out to the person who had query by the distributor. Uriel 
Heyd, “Some Aspects of the Ottoman Fatwa,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and 
African Studies, 32 (1), 1969, p.47; İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı Devletinin İlmiye 
Teşkilatı, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1988), pp.196-7.  
19
 Wael B. Hallaq, “Ifta‟ and Ijtihad in Sunni Legal Theory: A Developmental Account” 
in M. Khalid Massud, Brinkley Messick, and David Powers (eds) Islamic Legal 
Interpretation: Muftis and Their Fatwas, (Cambridge, Massachusetts, London: Harvard 
University Press, 1996), p.42. 
20
 Heyd, “Ottoman Fatwa,” p.46. 
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Ottoman fatwas can be classified into two main groups. One category is those 
issued at the center, by the şeyhülislams, and the second one consists of fatwas issued 
by provincial muftis. This does not mean that fatwas in each group were homogenous. 
However, the classification is useful to point out two different types of jurists. While the 
şeyhülislam delineated the general framework of the legal principles based on his 
personal interpretation, the provincial mufti had to stick with those general principles.
21
 
Despite the significance of fatwa as one of the main sources for Ottoman legal 
history,
22
 Ottoman fatwa is still among the understudied historical sources. The earliest 
studies on Ottoman fatwa were written in the 1950s. Ziya Yörükan and Mario Grignashi 
wrote their articles in 1952 and 1963 respectively and Fredrich Salle‟s dissertation was 
finished in 1962.
23
 Uriel Heyd‟s 1969 article appraised the place of fatwa in the 
Ottoman legal system; furthermore, he depicted the structure of the Ottoman fatwa.
24
 
Vehbi Ecer, in his article in 1970, focused on the significance of fatwa in Turkish 
culture.
25
 Ertuğrul Düzdağ‟s work in 1972 drew attention to Şeyhülislam Ebu‟s-su„ûd 
                                                 
21
 The provincial muftis, while issuing fatwas, had to refer to the works of previous 
authoritative jurists. Uzunçarşılı, İlmiye Teşkilatı, p.179. Heyd observes that the fatwas 
issued by the provincial muftis were supported via referece to the earlier jurists. 
“Ottoman Fatwa,” p. 45.   
22
 Other important sources are imperial edicts, kanunnames, and and court registers. 
Johansen enumerates the main five sources for  legal history: susbstantive law and legal 
theory (usûl and mütûn), commentaries (şurûh), fatwas, treatises, and court registers. 
Johansen, “Legal Literature,” pp.448-450. 
23
 Ziya Yörükan, “Bir Fetva Münasebeti ile, Fetva Müessesesi, Ebussuud Efendi ve Sarı 
Saltuk,” AUİFD, 1 (2-3), 1952,pp.137-160; Mario Trignashi, “La valeur du témiognage 
dans l‟empire Ottoman” Recueils de la Société Jean Bodin, 18, 1963, pp.211-323 cited 
in Ekin Tuşalp, “Treating Outlaws and Registering Miscreants in Early Modern 
Ottoman Society: A Study of Legal Diagnosis of Deviance in Şeyhülislam Fatwas” 
Unpublished MA Dissertation, Sabanci University, 2005, p. 3; Fredrich Salle, 
Proessrecht des XVI. Jahrhunderts Im Osmanishen Reich, Weisbaden, Ph.D, 1962, cited 
in Tuşalp,“Treating Outlaws” p.3.  
24
 Heyd, “Ottoman Fetva,” pp.35-56. 
25
 Vehbi Ecer, “Türk Kültürünün Tetkikinde Fetva Kitaplarının Önemi,” Türk Kültürü, 
90, 1970, pp. 402-404. 
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Efendi‟s fatwa compilations.26 However, these studies were followed by a two-decade- 
long hiatus, brought to an end by such scholars as Colin Imber
27
 and Haim Gerber.
28
  
The Ottoman fatwa has also been studied by some scholars whose main focus is 
the ulema and the office of şeyhülislam. Here we can cite the works of Veli Ertan,29 
İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı,30 and Abdülkadir Altunsu.31 This group of scholars has been 
interested in the ulema and office of şeyhülislam not only in the context of legal history, 
but also in the significance of this institution in Ottoman politics.
32
 
The şeyhülislam fatwas have not been used by scholars of legal history alone. 
They have been also used by social and economic historians. One good example is 
Tahsin Özcan‟s study of Ottoman artisans, using the fatwa compilations of four 
şeyhülislams who served in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries‟.33 There are also 
some theses that have used fatwas as sources for Ottoman social history.
34
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
26
 Mehmet Ertuğrul Düzdağ, Şeyhülislam Ebussuûd Efendi Fetvaları Işığında 16. Asır 
Türk Hayatı, (Istanbul Enderun Kitabevi, 1983). 
27
 Colin Imber, Ebu’s-su‘ud: The Islamic Legal Tradition (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
Univeristy Press, 1997).  
28
 Haim Gerber, State, Society, and Law in Islam: Ottoman Law in Comparative 
Perspetive, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994); and Islamic Law and 
Culture 1600-1840, (Leiden, Boston, Köln: Brill, 1999).  
29
 Veli Ertan, Tarihte Meşihat Makamı; İlmiye Sınıfı ve Meşhur Şeyhülislamlar, 
(Istanbul: Bahar Yayınevi, 1969). 
30
 İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, İlmiye Teşkilatı.  
31
 Abdülkadir Altunsu, Osmanlı Şeyhülislamları, (Ankara: Ayyıldız Matbaası A.Ş., 
1972). 
32
 See R.C. Repp, The Mufti of Istanbul.  
33
 Tahsin Özcan, Fetvalar Işığında Osmanlı Esnafı, (İstanbul: Kitabevi, 2003).  
34
 Gökçen Havva Art, “Through the Fetvas of Çatalcalı Ali Efendi the Relations 
between Women, Children and Men in the Seventeenth Century,” Unpublished MA 
Thesis Boğaziçi University, 1995; Kürşat Urungu Akpınar, “İltizam in the Fetvas of 
Ottoman Şeyhülislams,” Unpublished MA Thesis, Bilkent University, 2000.  
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C. Compilations under Study  
 
 
 
Since seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, further Islamicization of the Ottoman 
law (a shift from örf to sharia) has been observed by some scholars.35 Although the 
degree which this process of Islamicization influenced each part of the empire is a 
matter of debate,
36
 decline of kanun
37
 and an increase in the influence of sharia
38
 in this 
period is a general observation. In this context, taking into consideration Johansen‟s 
argument that fatwa was the main tool through which legal change and development 
took place, the significance of the fatwa compilations in seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries for the study of Ottoman law should be emphasized. 
This study covers sulh chapters of three eighteenth-century fatwa compilations. 
One of the compilations used as a primary source here is Fetâvâ-yi ‘Abdurrahîm by 
Menteşizade Abdürrahim Efendi (d.1128/1716), who held the office of şeyhülislam 
from June 26, 1715 to December 4, 1716.
39
 The published version has about 11050 
fatwas. This compilation does not contain the original evidences (nakl) which are used 
as the supporting material (mesned) for the fatwas. There are some other unpublished 
editions
40
 and a summary
41
 of this compilation available as well. 
                                                 
35
 Ömer Lutfi Barkan, XV-XVI ıncı Asırlarda Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Ziraî 
Ekonominin Hukukî ve Malî Esasları, (İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi, 1943).  
36
 Hülya Canbakal draws attention to the heterogeneity of such an Islamization impact 
in different areas of the empire. “Bir Kaç Fetva Bir Soru: Bir Hukuk Haritasına Doğru,” 
in Günay Kut and Fatma Büyükkarcı Yılmaz (eds.) Şinasi Tekin'in Anısına Uygurlardan 
Osmanlıya, (İstanbul: Simurg Kitapçılık, 2005), pp. 258-270.  
37
 Uriel Heyd, Studies in Old Ottoman Criminal Law, Edited by V.L. Ménage, (Oxford: 
At the Clarendon Press, 1973), p.152. 
38
 Heyd, Studies in Old Ottoman Criminal Law, pp.153-154.  
39
 The compilation was published by Dârüt-Tıbâati‟l-Ma„mûreti‟s-Sultâniyye, 
1243/1827. Mehmet İpşirli “Abdurrahim Efendi, Menteşzâde” DİA, I. p. 290. 
40
 One edition was done by fetva emîni Mehmed b. Ahmed b. Mustafa el-Gedûsî 
(d.1253/1837) with the title Fayz al-Karîm fî Nuqûl Fatâwâ ‘Abdurrahîm (İstanbul 
Müftülüğü Library, no 142-143, v.I-II, 455-469 folios, 3 Safar 1238/20.10.1822). Two 
other manuscript copies are available in Süleymaniye Library, H. Hüsnü Paşa, no.498 
and Yazma Bağışlar, no. 2006). El-Gedûsi provided the fatwas with their nukûl (pl. of 
nakl), showing the sources of the nukûl as well. A second edition was done by Malatyalı 
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Another source used in the study is Behcet el-Fetâvâ ma‘a’n-Nukûl, which is a 
compilation of fatwas by Şeyhülislam Yenişehirli Ebül‟-Fazl Abdullah b. Ahmed 
(d.1156/1743). Yenişehirli held office as şeyhülislam from May 7, 1718 to September 
30, 1730.
42
 This opus, as one of the most valuable Ottoman fatwa compilations was 
edited by fetva emîni Mehmed Fıkhî el-Ayni.43 Yenişehirli‟s fatwas were edited initially 
by himself. However, Ayni found the order of the fatwas inappropriate and therefore 
prepared an edition of his own. He included Yenişehirli‟s later fatwas as well. He also 
added the nukûl for each fatwa, writing down the exact place of the source. The title 
Behcet el-Fetâvâ was also given by Ayni as well. There are on other manuscript 
edition
44
 and two summaries
45
 available.          
The last compilation used as a primary source here is Netîce el-Fetâvâ ma‘a’n-
Nukûl, edited by es-Seyyid Ahmed Hafız Mehmed b.Ahmed b.Şeyh Mustafa el-Gedûsî 
(d.1253/1837).
46
 This opus, unlike the other two primary sources mentioned above, is 
the fatwa compilation of not one şeyhülislam, but of many şeyhülislams incumbent 
since 1143/1730. Netice was gradually compiled and the final version, edited by el-
Gedûsî, was published. Before that, fetva emîni Es-Seyyid Ahmed had fulfilled the wish 
of the incumbent şeyhülislam Dürrizade es-Seyyid Ahmed Efendi (1792-1798) to 
                                                                                                                                                        
Hocazâde Seyyid Mehmed Rasim Efendi (d.1316/1898) titled as Fetâvâ-yı ‘Abdurrahim 
ma‘a’n-Nukûl (İstanbul Müftülüğü No. 136). See Özen, “Fetva Literatürü,” pp. 301-
302.   
41
 A summary of the fatwas of „Abdurrahim is provided by fetva emîni Çeşmîzâde 
Mehmed Hâlis in his Khulâsa al-Ajwiba. Özen, “Fetva Literatürü,” p. 302.   
42
 Mehmet İpşirli, “Abdullah Efendi, Yenişehirli” DİA, I. p. 100. 
43
 It was published by Matbaa-i „Âmire, 1266/1850, 1289/1872, pp.643. 
44
 Fetâvâ-yı Vîdînî (Beyazıt State Library, Beyazıt Section, no.2772). Şükrü Özen, 
Osmanlı Döneminde Fetva Literatürü,” Türkiye Araştırmaları Literatür Dergisi, 3 (5), 
2005, p. 304. 
45
 Fındıklı Süleyman Efendi Al-Fihrist al-Kâmil li Bahjat al-Fatâwâ. Şükrü Özen has 
identified three different manuscripts of this book. One is in Süleymaniye Library, 
Kasidecizâde Section, no 267 (1b-77b) having the date of 18 Zilka„da 1200 (12.9.1786). 
The other one is in Süleymaniye Library, Hacı Mahmud Ef., no.1239, ist.1209/1794, 
159 sheets. The last one is in Murat Molla Library, Murad Molla, no. 1187, ist. 
1185/1771, 62 folios. According to Şükrü Özen‟s work, which is based on the first 
copy, Fındıklı Süleyman Efendi provided summaries of the fatwas so that finding the 
detailed fatwas with their nukûl would be easier. Özen, “Fetva Literatürü,” p. 303. The 
second summary to be mentiones is Çeşmizade Mehmed Hâlis‟s Khulâsa al-Ajwiba. 
Ahmet Özel, “Behcetü‟l-fetâvâ,” DİA, V. p.346.      
46
 It was published in Istanbul, Matbaa-i Âmire, 1237, 1265/1849. 
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compile the fatwas of previous şeyhülislams in one book to be presented to the Sultan. 
Es-Seyyid Ahmed named the book as Netîce el-Fetâvâ.47 This compilation was edited 
later by el-Gedûsî in 1226 (1811), adding the nukûl from classical legal books to 
support the fatwas of Netice. This later version was published in Istanbul, 1265 (1849). 
In this last version, the names of nine şeyhülislams whose fatwas were compiled in the 
work are given in abbreviated form.
48
 However the fatwas in Netice are not confined to 
those of these nine şeyhülislams49 but include fatwas of other şeyhülislams whose full 
names are mentioned in the compilation.
50
         
Another primary source used for this study belongs to the fürû‘ genre,51 
elucidating the principles of the law in practice, rather than legal theory (usûl-ı fıkh). 
The source is Mülteka’l-Ebhar the main opus of Burhânuddîn52 İbrahim b. Muhammed 
b. İbrahim el-Halebî, one of the most well-known Ottoman jurists,53 and a contemporary 
of Süleyman the Magnificent. Mülteka is based on famous Hanafi works such as el-
Kudûrî‟s (d.428/1037) el-Muhtasar, el-Mavsılî‟s (d.683/1203) el-Muhtâr, Ebu‟l-
                                                 
47
 Istanbul University Merkez Library, Nadir Eserler-Türkçe Bölümü, no. 4696.   
48
 The names of these nine şeyhülislams are: Mirzazade Şeyh Mehmed Efendi (1730-
1731), Paşmakçızade Es-Seyyid Abdullah Efendi (1731-32); Damadzade Ebühayr 
Ahmed Efendi (1755-56); İsmail Efendizade İshak Efendi (1733-34), Dürri Mehmed 
Efendi (1734-36); Feyzullah Efendizade Es-Seyyid Mustafa Efendi (1736-45), Ak 
Mahmudzade Es-Seyyid Mehmed Zeynü‟l-Abidin Efendi (1746-48), Karaismail 
Efendizade Mehmed Es‟ad Efendi (1748-49), and Karahalil Efendizade Mehmed Said 
Efendi (1749-50). 
49
 As mistakenly proposed by Ekin Tuşalp, “Treating Outlaws,” pp.29-30. 
50
 Some of these şeyhülislams are Pîrîzâde Mehmed; Damadzâde Feyzullah; Dürrizade 
Mustafa; Mehmed Salih; Veliyüddin; [Salihzâde] Mehmed Emîn; Dürrîzâde Ataullah; 
Dürrîzâde Mehmed Ârif; Müftîzâde Ahmed; Mekkî Mehmed Efendi; Es-Seyyid 
Mehmed Kâmil; Mehmed Şerîf; and Hamîdîzâde Mustafa. Özen, “Fetva Literatürü,” p. 
270.   
51
 One limitation of this study is the usage of different genres for the sake of 
comparison. Comparing the fatwa compilations of eighteenth century with those of 
sixteenth century (for example that of Ebu‟s-su„ûd) would be more appropriate. 
However, since this study is based on the printed works due to the time considerations, 
and the debate on contiuity and change in legal principles is of secondary importance, 
Mülteka was preferred.   
52
 According to Şükrü Selim Has , “Halebî, İbrahim b. Muhammed”, the name 
Burhânuddîn, although added by Süyûtî and Joseph Schacht,  is neither used by Halebi 
himself nor does it exist in the Ottoman sources. DİA, XV. p.231.   
53
 Though his biography might make him pre-Ottoman as much as Ottoman, it is the 
broad usage of his opus Mülteka by the Ottoman ulema that places him more 
appropriately in the category of Ottoman jurist.     
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Berekât en-Nasafî‟s (d.710/1310) Kenz-üd’dekâik, and Burhaneddin Mahmud el-
Mahbûdî‟s (d.745/1344) Vikâyet er-rivâye was completed in the year 923/1517.54 Later, 
it was taught as a textbook in Ottoman madrasas and used as a handbook by muftis and 
kadıs of the following generations.55 It was published many times,56 and has more than 
fifty expounded versions (şerhs)57 and translations.58 The version used here is the şerh 
of Muhammed Mevkûfâtî (d.1654).59 Halebi helps to establish a link between the pre-
Ottoman legal texts and those of the eighteenth-century şeyhülislams.   
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
54
 Has , “Halebî,” p. 232; Joseph Schacht, “al-Halabî”, EI2, III. p.90; Ahmet Özel, 
Hanefi Fıkıh Alimleri, (Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 2006), p.123. 
55
 Has , “Halebî,” p.232; Uzunçarşılı, İlmiye Teşkilatı, p.173; Ahmet Özel, Hanefi Fıkıh 
Alimleri, p. 123. 
56
 Istanbul, 1252, 1258, 1260, 1271, 1303, 1309, 1316, 1325; Bulak, 1263; Bombay, 
1278 cited in Şükrü Selim Has , “Halebî.”  
57
 Has , “Halebî;” Ahmet Özel, Hanefi Fıkıh Alimleri, p.123, provides a list of important 
şerhs on Mülteka as: A) Şeyhzade, Abdurrahim b. Muhammed (d.1078/1667), 
Mecme’ul-enhür. This opus is known as Dâmâd and published many times (Cairo, 
1298; Istanbul, 1241, 1257, 1264, 1276, 1287, 1304, 1310, 1317, and1329). B) 
Muhammed b. Ali el-Haskefî (d.1088/1677), Ed-Dürr’ül-Müntekâ (Istanbul, 1317, 
1327). C)Mahmud el-Bâkânî (d.1003/1594), Mecra’l-enhür. A şerh by D) Muhammed 
b. Muhammed el-Benhesî (d.987/1579). Mevkûfâtî has şerh in Turkish language 
(Bulak, 1254; Istanbul, 1269, 1276).   
58
 Mouradgea d‟Ohsson, Tableau general de l’Empire Ottoman, I-III, Paris, 1787-1820; 
I-VII, Paris1788-1824 involves a summary of Mülteka. H. Sauvaire, Le Moultaka el 
abheur, avec commentaire abrege du Madjma el-enheur, Marseille, 1876, 1882 
translates Mülteka and Şeyhzade Abdurrahim‟s şerh on it, Mecme’ul-enhür. Cited in 
Ahmet Özel, Hanefi Fıkıh Alimleri, p.123.    
59
 İbrahim Halebi, Şerh-i Mülteka el-Ebhur: Mevkufat, translated and latinized by 
Nedim Yılmaz, 1993, İstanbul: İlmi Neşriyat.   
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
 
 
A. Definitions 
 
 
 
Sulh is a rigorously defined contract in the Islamic classical texts of law. Many 
details have been provided regarding different occasions and possibilities to eradicate 
any possible point of obscurity. This fact contradicts with Weberian argument of 
„kadijustiz‟, i.e. a kind of justice effected by kadıs who are not bounded by any rules 
and principles, as well as some anthropological studies of Islamic peacemaking in the 
field of Conflict Resolution on the other. The former argues for lack of doctrinal rigor 
while the latter takes the concept of sulh as a mere ritual of negotiation and mediation in 
Islamic societies. One aim of this section is to show how scrupulously Islamic law 
examines this legal concept leaving no space for judges‟ personal discretion. This 
section will help us to scrutinize the existence of either continuity or change of the legal 
principles from the pre-Ottoman classical period to the eighteenth century.  
The latter, i.e. students of Islamic conflict resolution, make big generalizations 
about the Islamic societies and their differences with the Western societies to reach the 
conclusion that indigenous methods of conflict resolution in the Islamic societies are 
worth taking into consideration. The data in the compilations under study contradicts 
those generalizations, demonstrating a considerable extent of formalism in the Ottoman 
legal system as well as a high degree of individualism in the Ottoman society as 
perceived by the law.       
A chronological order will be followed in giving the definitions and conditions of 
sulh, starting from the pre-Ottoman Hanafi classical texts, continuing with the 
prominent opus of the 16
th
-century Ottoman jurist, Halebi, and finalizing with the 18
th
 
century şeyhülislam Abdurrahim. The other two compilations are not included in the 
14 
 
first chapter. For the purpose of the first chapter, i.e. providing a general definition and 
comparision of that over time, it is sufficient to cover one of the fatwa compilations of 
an eighteenth-century şeyhülislam.60 For the pre-Ottoman classical texts, the citations of 
the secondary litertura has been used. Some of the existing works on sulh has taken an 
a-historical approach towards the concept; citing simultaneously for the same issue from 
a broad range of Islamic jurists, since the classical time to nineteenth century. In this 
study, it has been deliberately tried to look for non/pre-Ottoman jurists so that a 
meaningful comparison would become possible. The sources used are: Zeyle„î‟s 
(d.743/1343), Tebyîn’ül-Hakâik,61 Tarâblusî‟s (d.1440), Mu‘în’ül-Hukkâm,62 
Semerkandî‟s (d.539/1144), Tuhfet’ül-Fukahâ,63 İbn Nüceym‟s (d.970/1563) el-Bahr’ 
ür-Râik and el-Eşbah,64 Kasani‟s (587/1191) Bedayi,65 el-Bâberti‟s (786/1384) El-
İnâye,66 İbn‟ül-Hümam‟s (p.861/1457) Feth’ul-Kadir,67 and Es-Serahsi‟s (d.483/1090) 
el-Mebsût.68  
 
 
 
A.1. Sulh According to the Pre-Ottoman Classical Jurists:  
 
 
A lexicographic definition of the concept of sulh is peace, reconciliation, 
compromise, and amicable engagement.
69
 Amicable peacemaking or reconciliation can 
involve any kind of disagreement or dispute among people, involving either material or 
                                                 
60
 Furthermore, the fatwas in sulh chapter in Abdurrahim‟s compilation form 68 percent 
of the total number of the fatwas in all three compilations under study (235 out of 347).  
61
 Özel, Hanefi Fıkıh Alimleri, p. 79:  
62
 Özel, Hanefi Fıkıh Alimleri, pp.99-100. 
63
 Özel, Hanefi Fıkıh Alimleri, pp.47-48. 
64
 Özel, Hanefi Fıkıh Alimleri, p.125; Özel, “İbn Nüceym, Zeynüddin,” DİA, XX. 
pp.236-37. 
65
 Özel, Hanefi Fıkıh Alimleri, p.54; Ferhat Koca, “Kâsânî,” DİA, XXIV, p.424. 
66
 Özel, Hanefi Fıkıh Alimleri, pp.88-89; Arif Aytekin, “Bâbertî,” DİA, IV. pp. 377-378. 
67
 Özel, Hanefi Fıkıh Alimleri, pp. 102-3; Ferhat Koca, “İbnü‟l-Hümâm,” DİA, XXI. 
pp.87-90.  
68
 Özel, Hanefi Fıkıh Alimleri, p.40; N. Calder, “Al-Sarakhsî,” EI2, IX, pp.35-36.  
69
 Sir James Redhouse (ed.) Turkish and English Lexicon, 2
nd
 Edition, Istanbul: Enes 
Matbaası, 2001.  
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non-material claims. Sulh in Islamic law, however, is limited to material disputes.
70
 At 
the same time, sulh can refer to a “peace treaty” among Muslim communities, or 
between Muslim and non-Muslim communities.
71
 This last denotation of the concept is 
excluded in this study. A definition of the concept in the Islamic law can be provided as 
“contract made by parties in order to end the disputes between them, in return for some 
amount to be paid (bedel)”72 or “an agreement of reconciliation that terminates a dispute 
between disputants with their consent”.73 
In a sulh contract, there are two parties (musâlih): one is the plaintiff (müdde‘î) 
and the other is the defendant (müdde‘â ‘aleyh) and the contract involves a disputed 
issue (musâlah-un ‘anh or müdde‘â bih) and a price to be paid for the settlement (bedel 
or musalah-un ‘aleyh).74 The abovementioned definitions and components of sulh 
explicitly indicate the necessity of a claim for the sulh contract. 
In the Hanafi law, there are three categories of sulh: sulh ‘an-ikrâr, sulh ‘an-inkâr, 
and sulh ‘an-sükût. These three categories are based on the way the defendant reacts to 
the claim of the plaintiff. If the defendant concedes that the plaintiff‟s claim is accurate, 
then the ensuing sulh contract is called a sulh ‘an-ikrâr. The sulh cases in which there is 
some positive evidence such as testimony or a written document that proves the 
accuracy of the claim, are characterized as sulh ‘an-ikrâr.75 If the defendant denies the 
claim the ensuing sulh becomes a sulh ‘an-inkâr. Finally, if the defendant remains quiet, 
giving neither a positive nor negative reaction to the claim of the plaintiff, then the 
ensuing sulh contract is called a sulh ‘an-sükût.76 In all three cases, whatever the 
                                                 
70
 The rights disputed have material values; marriage, inheritance, ownership of slavery, 
corporeal integration, etc. are rights of such characteristic.   
71
 M. Khadduri, “Sulh” EI2, IX. p.845.   
72
 Zeyle„î, Tebyin’ül-Hakaik, V. p.29, cited in Davut Yaylalı, İslam Hukukunda Sulh, 
(Istanbul: Taştan Matbaacılık, 1993), p.13. 
73
 Aida Othman “„And Sulh is Best‟: Amicable Settlement and Dispute Resolution in 
Islamic Law,” Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard University, 2005, p. 140. 
74
 Dilmen, Kamus, VIII. p. 5; Mecelle Art. 1532, 1533, 1534.  
75
 Zeyle„î, Tebyin’ül-Hakâik, V. pp. 30-31 and Tarablusî, Mu‘în’ül-Hukkâm, p. 153, 
cited in Yaylalı, Sulh, p. 58; Es-Semerkandi, Tuhfe, III. 250-256, cited in Abdullah 
Ramazanoğlu, “1876 Nolu Trabzon Şer‟iyye Sicili ve Bu Sicil Çerçevesinde Sulh 
Akdi,” Unpublished M.A. Thesis, Karadeniz Teknik Üniversitesi, 2001, p.46.  
76
 M. Khadduri, “Sulh,” p.845; Mecelle, Art. 1535. 
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reaction of the defendant is, both parties specify the amount of bedel to be paid to the 
plaintiff by the defendant.
77
 
Sulh ‘an-inkâr and its validity have been discussed among jurists of different legal 
schools. The Hanafi School accepts it as a valid type. The main logic behind this type of 
sulh is to give the defendant the right not to take oath. When the defendant rejects the 
claim, the plaintiff is asked to prove the claim. If he fails, then the defendant is asked to 
take oath. The defendant prefers to make sulh rather than to take the oath. Therefore, for 
the plaintiff, unlike the defendant, sulh ‘an-inkâr is like an exchange because the 
plaintiff receives the claimed article or a bedel for that. Hence, different rules are 
applied to the two parties of the sulh. For example, if bedel is real estate, then şuf’a right 
exists. The plaintiff is similar to one who purchases the real estate in exchange for his 
claimed right. However, there is no şuf‘a right in musâlahun ‘anh because the defendant 
does not give the bedel to exchange for this real estate but to avoid taking the oath. 
Therefore, since it is not like a sale contract, there is no şuf‘a right either.78  
If it becomes clear that musâlahun ‘anh belongs to a third party, the bedel received 
by the plaintiff should be reimbursed.
79
 However, after the conclusion of the sulh ‘an-
inkâr, it can not be invalidated with new evidence brought by the plaintiff or the 
confession of the defendant.
80
 However, if the plaintiff is a trustee (vekîl) of a minor, 
further evidence brought after the sulh ‘an inkâr is concluded is acceptable.81 These 
rules regarding sulh ‘an-inkâr are applied to sulh ‘an-sükût as well.82   
There is another category, ibrâ, which is usually studied under the chapter of sulh 
in Ottoman fatwa compilations used in this study.
83
 İbrâ is a unilateral contract by 
                                                 
77
 Eruğrul Koyunkalın, “İslâm Hukukunda Sulh,” Unpublished M.A. Thesis, Marmara 
University, Istanbul, 1992, pp. 27-28; Ramazanoğlu, “Şer‟yye Sicili ve Sulh Akdi,” pp. 
46-54. 
78
 Zeyle„î, Tebyin’ül-Hakaik, V. p. 33 andİbn Nüceym, El-Bahr’ur-Raik VII. p. 256, 
cited in Yaylalı, Sulh, pp. 65-66. 
79
 Yaylalı, Sulh, p. 66. 
80
 İbn Nüceym, El-Bahr’ur-Râik VII, p.256, cited in Yaylalı, Sulh, p.176.  
81
 Yaylalı, Sulh, p. 67. 
82
 Zeyle„î, Tebyin’ül-Hakaik, V. p. 30, cited in Yaylalı, Sulh, pp. 68-69.  
83
 All of the three compilations under the study have ibra as a subtitle in the Chapter of 
Sulh.  
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which one party releases the other of some or all of his rights.
84
 It should be emphasized 
that it is the rights that are released not some or the whole of the disputed article 
(‘ayn).85 In a sulh contract, if a plaintiff receives part of the article (‘ayn) she claims and 
releases the remaining part, the sulh is invalid and the plaintiff can claim the remaining 
part as well.
86
 
 
 
  
A.2. Conditions of Sulh: 
 
 
A sulh contract, in order to be valid, requires fulfillment of certain conditions. 
These conditions can be classified in three categories: conditions that pertain to the 
parties of the sulh (musâlihûn), conditions pertaining to what the sulh is made upon 
(musâlahun ‘anh), and conditions concerning the price (bedel).  
 
 
 
A.2.a. Conditions concerning the musâlihûn 
 
 
In the first category, the primary condition for sulh is the free will of both parties. 
Therefore, if a person is forced to make a sulh, the contract is null and void
87
 unless the 
forced person gives his consent after force upon him is removed.
88
 Similar to rent and 
sale, in sulh there is need for explicit utterance by both parties: offer (îcâb) and 
                                                 
84
 Apaydın, “İbra” DİA, XXI, p. 263.   
85
 In this case, it becomes grant (hibe), not ibrâ.   
86
 El-Baberti, El-İnaye, VII. p.30 and İbn el-Hümâm, Feth’ül-Kadir, VII. p.30 cited in 
Yaylalı, Sulh, pp. 86-87. 
87
 El-Kasani, Bedayi V. p. 176, cited in Yaylalı, Sulh, pp.40.  
88
 Es-Serahsi, El-Mebsut XXIV. pp. 56-57; İbn Nüceym, El-Eşbah p.282, cited in 
Yaylalı, Sulh, pp.41-42. 
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acceptance (kabûl), which are called the pillars (rükns) of sulh.89 However, in ibrâ 
cases, only the offer suffices.
90
  
In all compacts (‘akds), including sulh, explicit utterance by the parties involved 
indicating the free will requires the use of simple past tense (mâzî). Other tenses, for 
example present or future tenses (muzâri‘), do not perform such a function. Therefore, if 
a tense other than the simple past tense is used, further evidence is required to make 
sure that the statement represents the will of the parties for the compact.
91
 This 
expression can be either oral or written. Îcâb can be expressed via a messenger as 
well.
92
 In case a party is dumb, he can express his will by signs.
93
  
There are three conditions for the offer and acceptance: a) the acceptance should 
refer to the thing that is offered, b) the offer and acceptance should take place in the 
same meeting (meclis-i sulh), and c) the offer should not be renounced before the 
acceptance.
94
  
The parties to sulh should have competence (ehliyet) to make a contract. 
Competence is defined as having the capacity to reason (‘akl) and discern (temyîz).95 
Therefore, a minor who is competent can be a party to sulh. A minor who is capable of 
                                                 
89
 Yaylalı mentions the distinction between fundamental principles (rukns) and 
conditions (sharts). Rukn is a part of the compact; i.e. îcâb and kabûl are parts of the 
sulh compact; without which sulh compact does not exist. Shart is also necessary for the 
validity of the compact; however, it is not a part of the compact. pp. 27-28.    
90
 İbn Nüceym, El-Bahr’ür-Raik; VII. p.255, cited in Yaylalı, Sulh, pp. 30-31; El-
Baberti, El-İnaye, VIII, p.403, cited in Koyunkalın, “Sulh,” pp.45-46.  
91
 El-Kasani, El-Bedayi V. pp.133-134 cited in Karaman, Mukayeseli İslam Hukuku, 
(Istanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 2006), II, pp. 64; el-Kasani, el-Bedâi, V. p.133, cited in 
Ramazanoğlu, “Şer‟yye Sicili ve Sulh Akdi,” 28.  
92
 El-Kasani, El-Bedayi, III. p.138, cited in Karaman, Mukayeseli İslam Hukuku, II. 68-
69. 
93
 Yaylalı, Sulh, p. 33. 
94
 El-Kasani, El-Bedayi, V. p.136, cited in Yaylalı, Sulh, p.35.  
95
 Although there are further elaboration on the concept of ahliyat and its further sub-
classifications, I did not find it necessary to go further into the details. For more 
information see Laleh Bakhtiar, Encyclopedia of Islamic Law: A Compendium of Major 
Schools, (Chicago: ABC International Group, Inc 1996), pp.395-393; Schacht, 
Introduction, pp.124-5; J Johansen, Baber, “Secular and Religious Elements in Hanafite 
Law: Function and Limits of the Absolute Character of Government Authority,” in his 
(ed.) Contingency in a Sacred Law: Law and Ethical Norms in the Muslim Fiqh, 
(Leiden, Boston, Köln: Brill, 1999), pp.194-200; Yaylalı, Sulh pp. 36-37. 
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making distinctions (mümeyyiz) and is permitted to engage in trade (me’zûn) can make 
sulh as long as the contract brings her absolute benefit; contracts that cause harm to her 
interests are invalid.
96
 A mümeyyiz and me’zûn minor can be party to contracts that 
might both benefit or harm her interests by the permission of his guardian (velî). Any 
sulh made personally by incompetent minors and insane people are null and void.
97
 Sulh 
made by an inebriated person is invalid.
98
 
Representatives (vekîls), guardians (velîs), or custodians (vasîs) of minor children 
or insane people can make sulh on behalf of those under their protection only if the sulh 
does not harm the latter‟s interests.99     
Being a representative for a dispute, however, does not mean that the 
representative has automatically the right to make sulh on behalf of the person he 
represents (müvekkil). A sulh made by a representative who is not explicitly permitted to 
do so is null and void, unless the person who is represented later gives his consent.
100
 
When a müvekkil gives his consent, then he becomes responsible for the bedel.101  
A self-appointed, unauthorized representative (fuzûlî) can make sulh on behalf of 
another person in four situations: when the unauthorized representative (a) guarantees 
the bedel, (b) makes sulh upon his own property, i.e. states that bedel will be from his 
property, (c) shows some present cash or non-cash, non-real estate property as bedel, or 
(d) makes sulh upon a certain amount of cash and pays it. In the latter case, if the 
unauthorized representative does not pay the bedel, then the validity of sulh depends 
upon the consent of the party represented. If he gives his consent, then he should pay the 
bedel. If he does not accept the sulh, then it is null and void.
102
     
A person who is overwhelmed with debts and wants to make sulh upon some of 
his rights, needs the consent of his creditors. Similarly, a person who has a fatal disease 
                                                 
96
 El-Kasani, Bedayi, VI. p.40, cited in Yaylalı, Sulh, pp. 38-39. 
97
 El-Kasani, El-Bedayi, VI. p.40, cited in Ramazanoğlu, “Şer‟yye Sicili ve Sulh Akdi,” 
p.31. 
98
 For a debate on this issue see Yaylalı,  Sulh, pp. 37-38. 
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 El-Kasani, El-Bedayi, VI. p.41, cited in Yaylalı, Sulh, pp. 39-40. 
100
 Yaylalı, Sulh, p.43. 
101
 Yaylalı, Sulh, p.44. 
102
 Zeyle„î, Tebyün’ül-Hakaik, V. pp.40-41, cited in  Yaylalı, Sulh, pp. 46-47. 
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can not give more than one third of his property to others without the permission of the 
heirs.
103
                 
 
 
 
A.2.b. Conditions of the musâlahun ‘anh:    
 
 
According to Islamic law, the legal claims and liabilities are classified mainly in 
two categories: the legal “claims of God” (Hukuk’ul-lah) and the legal “claims of men” 
(Hukuk’ul-‘ibâd).104 “Legal claims of God” are about guaranteeing the order in and 
interests of the society. These rights can not be released even partially. Therefore, 
individuals do not have the right to make sulh upon such rights. Rights of God are 
divided into two categories. First is those related to worshiping (‘ibâdât) such as the 
alms (zakât) or the prayer (namâz). The second is those related to punishments (hudûd) 
such as punishment for fornication, consumption of alcoholic beverages, highway 
robbery, and unintentional homicide.
105
 Any sulh transaction made upon these rights is 
null and void.
106
 
In the legal “claims of men” are included the law of transactions, the rules 
governing marriage family and inheritance and parts of the penal law,
107
 all of which 
can be subject to sulh. Individuals have the right to make sulh on these claims in return 
for a bedel or without one. For example, possession of properties such as houses, land, 
or animals; usage of houses, shops, or house equipments; services such as doing some 
work; bequests belonging to heirs; and debts can all be subjects of sulh.
108
 
                                                 
103
 El-Kasani, Bedayi, VI. P.40, cited in  Koyunkalın, “Sulh,” p.48 
104
 Johansen, “Secular and Religious Elements,” p.200; Hayrettin Karaman, Mukayeseli 
İslam Hukuku, II. p. 471. 
105
 Since the amount of diyet is clarified in shari‘a, one can not make sulh upon this 
amount; because, any increase in this amount would mean ribâ. Yaylalı, Sulh, p.50. 
This issue will be further elaborated in the second chapter.  
106
 El-Kasani, Bedayi, VI. pp. 48-49, cited in  Koyunkalın, “Sulh,”  p.51; El-Kasani, 
Bedayi, VI. p.48 and El-Zeyle„î Tebyin’ül-Hakaik, V. p.37,  cited in Ramazanoğlu, 
“Şer‟yye Sicili ve Sulh Akdi,” pp.33-34; El-Kasani, Bedayi, VII, pp.483; Zeyle„î, 
Tebyin’ül-Hakaik, V. p.482, cited in Othman, “Sulh is Best,” pp.28-29. 
107
 Johansen, “Secular and Religious Elements,” p.200. 
108
 Koyunkalın, “Sulh,” p.52. 
21 
 
There are some rights that involve a mixture of the rights of God and rights of 
men. In such cases, the regulation pertaining to the predominant element, either the 
rights of God or rights of men, is valid. For example, the punishment for slander to 
chaste women, the right of alimony, fatherhood, custody, and pedigree (neseb)
109
 can 
not be subject to sulh. However, sulh can be made upon mixed rights such as retaliation 
(kısâs), blood money (diyet), dowry given to the bride by her husband for marriage 
(mehr), and the money that the wife gives up for divorce (hul‘).110  
Musâlahun ‘anh should be a right belonging to the musâlih.111 Furthermore, 
musâlahun ‘anh itself should belong to the musâlih. For example, a şuf‘adar112 has the 
right of preemption of a neighboring house. However, this right does not give him the 
authority to make sulh on the neighboring house.
113
 Musâlahun ‘anh can be unknown, 
as long as it is not required to be given back.
114
   
 
 
 
A.2.c. Conditions of bedel 
 
 
Conditions of contracts that are most similar to the cases at hand are applicable in 
sulh. If bedel involves a benefit, then the contract is like rent.
115
 Therefore, rules 
regarding rent are applied to this kind of sulh as well. For example, if one party to the 
                                                 
109
 A divorced woman claims that a child belongs to her ex-husband. The man 
repudiates the woman‟s claim. In this situation, a sulh made upon the pedigree of the 
child by the woman and the man is invalid, because this right belongs to the child.    
110
 Ramazanoğlu, “Şer‟yye Sicili ve Sulh Akdi,” p.35. 
111
 El-Kasani, Bedâyi, VI. P.49 cited in Yaylalı, Sulh, pp. 52-53. 
112
 Şuf‘a: a right or claim of preemption in respect of an adjoining real estate; şuf‘adar: 
a person who has such a right.  
113
 El-Kasani, Bedâyi, V. 20 and Zeyle„î, Tebyin’ül-Hakaik, V. 257, cited in Yaylalı, 
Sulh, pp. 53-54. 
114
 El-Kasani, Bedayi, VI. p.49, cited in Ramazanoğlu, “Şer‟yye Sicili ve Sulh Akdi,” p. 
37. 
115
 Zeyle„î, Tebyîn’ül-Hakâik, V.p. 257, cited in Yaylalı, Sulh, p.54; also see Serahsi, El-
Mebsut XX, p.157 and El-Zeyle„î, Tebyin’ül-Hakaik V. p. 471, cited in Othman, “Sulh 
is Best,” p.142.  
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sulh dies before the benefit is used, i.e. the bedel is delivered, the sulh is null and 
void.
116
   
If bedel is a portion of what is claimed by the plaintiff, it means that the remaining 
part is donated to the defendant, i.e. it is like ibrâ. In fact, the only way to legitimize this 
kind of transaction is to perceive it as ibrâ, otherwise, it would be like ribâ (interest). 
Any concessions in the quantity and/or quality of the disputed article can be made by 
only the plaintiff.
117
 Therefore, if the amount of bedel is more than the musâlahun ‘anh, 
the sulh is null and void. Likewise, if the period of payment is shortened, the sulh is 
invalid again, even if the bedel is less than the musâlahun ‘anh. 118 In the latter case, 
however, if the bedel is different than the musâlahun ‘anh then abridging the time of 
payment does not invalidate the sulh.
119
  
It is in this context that conditional ibrâ is invalid. If a plaintiff offers the 
defendant to release him of some of his rights in return for some concessions, for 
example on the condition that the defendant shortens the time of payment, the sulh will 
be invalid. However, if the plaintiff releases the defendant of some of the rights and 
asks him to give the rest in advance, this sulh is valid, because here the plaintiff does 
not base the ibrâ on a condition.120 It is important to note that if the condition is not 
about a concession to be made by the defendant, then it does not invalidate the sulh.
121
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 Abu Hanifa and Abu Muhammad Shaibani supported this idea; however, Abu Yusuf 
had some reservations. Zeyle„î, V. p. 30 cited in Yaylalı, Sulh, p. 74-75. 
117
 Zeyle„î, V. p. 42, cited in Yaylalı, Sulh p.79.  
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 Yaylalı, Sulh, p.79. 
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 Yaylalı, Sulh, p. 80.  
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 Yaylalı, Sulh, p. 82. 
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 For example, the plaintiff promises the defendant that if he pays half of the debt until 
tomorrow, then he will be released of the other half, otherwise, he has to pay all the 
debt. If the defendant pays the half in one day, he will be released of the other half, 
otherwise he will not. However, if the plaintiff just says that the defendant will be 
released of half if he pays the other half in one day and does not mention what will 
happen if the defendant does not pay the half, then there are two possibilities: a) the 
defendant pays the specified amount in the specified time; b) he fails to pay. In the first 
situation, all Hanafites agree that if the defendant pays the half he will be released of the 
other half. In the second situation, there is a debate between Abu Hanifa and Imam 
Muhammed Shaibani on the one hand and Abu Yusuf on the other. The former support 
the invalidity of the sulh, i.e. they argue that the defendant should pay all the debt. The 
latter argues for the validity of such a sulh anyway. El-Kasani, Bedayi, VI. p.44 and 
Zeyle„î, Tebyin’ül-Hakaik, V. p.43, cited in Yaylalı, Sulh, pp. 84-85.      
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The sulh contract is similar to bey‘ (sale) if the bedel is ‘ayn122 such as identified 
real estate; or specified mekîl,123 mevzûn,124 or goods; and the bedel is like mebi‘ (sold). 
If the bedel is a debt (deyn) such as unspecified mekîl, mevzûn, gold, and silver, again 
the sulh contract is like sale; and the bedel is like semen.
125
 When the sulh contract is 
similar to sale, rules regarding sale such as hıyar-ı şart,126 hıyar-ı ‘ayb,127 hıyar-ı 
rü’yet,128 and the right of şuf‘a129 are applied to sulh as well.130 Whatever is appropriate 
to be the semen or mebi‘ in sale, can be bedel-i sulh as well. As semen in sale can not be 
unknown, bedel can not be unknown either.
131
 Again, similar to semen in sale, if the 
bedel will be paid later, the time for that should be precisely specified.
132
 
One condition for bedel is that it should be mütekavvim.133 Things that are non-
mütekavvim such as carrion, blood, and wine can not be bedel. In case one such item has 
been used as bedel, the sulh contract is null and void. However, there is no need to 
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 ‘ayn: something of concrete external existence, such as a book, house, horse, 
furniture, certain amount of money or wheat. Mehmet Erdoğan, Fıkıh ve Hukuk 
Terimleri Sözlüğü, (Istanbul: Ensar Neşriyat, 2005), p. 40. 
123
 mekîl: (adjective and noun) measurable according to its capacity, such as wheat, 
barley.  
124
 mevzûn: (adjective and noun) weighable. 
125
 semen: the price of a sold article.  
126
 Hıyar-ı şart: the right of one or both parties of a contract to either invalidate or 
promulgate the contract in a certain period of time, Mehmet Erdoğan, Fıkıh ve Hukuk 
Terimleri Sözlüğü, p.195.  
127
 Hıyar-ı ‘ayb: If there is a deficiency in the bedel, the plaintiff can refuse it.  Mehmet 
Erdoğan, Fıkıh ve Hukuk Terimleri Sözlüğü, p.194. 
128
 Hıyar-ı rü’yet: If the plaintiff does not see the bedel while accepting the sulh 
agreement, he has the right to accept or refuse the bedel whe he sees it. Mehmet 
Erdoğan, Fıkıh ve Hukuk Terimleri Sözlüğü, p.195. 
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 See above note 112. 
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 Yaylalı, Sulh, p. 71.  
131
 Yaylalı, Sulh, 61.  
132
 Yaylalı, Sulh, p. 71.  
133
 Mütekavvim: something that has financial value. This definition excludes: a) 
something too valuable to be subject for a transaction, such as human life; b) anything 
abject and sordid according to religion, such as pork and faeces; c) anything forbidden 
by religion, such as idols; d) too insignificant things, such as a cluster of grass; and e) 
something that is protected (muhrez) such as the fish in the seas, naturally grown fruits 
and grasses. Mehmet Erdoğan, Fıkıh ve Hukuk Terimleri Sözlüğü, p. 438.    
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reimburse the bedel, because such a contract is conceived as sulh without bedel or a 
kind of discharge (afv).
134
 
Bedel should be the property of the musâlih. However, if sulh is made upon an 
identified item that belongs to a third person, the sulh is valid only by the permission of 
the owner of the item. In that case, the owner gets the price of the item from the 
musâlih. If a sulh is made upon an unidentified ‘ayn or deyn (debt) such as gold and 
silver that belongs to a third party, again the sulh is valid. In this case, however, it is the 
musâlih who should give the bedel to the plaintiff.135 After a sulh is concluded, if it is 
revealed that the bedel belongs to a third person, the sulh is null and void; the bedel is 
given to its owner and the dispute remains.
136
  
The bedel should be identified (ma‘lûm). If the bedel is present, then it is 
sufficient to be pointed at without mentioning the amount and the quality of the item. 
However, if the bedel is not present, then it will be identified in one of these four ways: 
a) if it is cash, its type and amount should be clarified, otherwise, the money used 
commonly in the region will be assumed, b) if it is mekîl and mevzûn, then the amount 
and quality should be specified; c) if it is cloth, in addition to the amount and quality, 
the time of delivery should be mentioned as well. Here, it has the characteristics of 
selem.
137
 And finally, d) if the bedel involves animals, it is not enough to mention the 
amount and quality, but also the type of the animal should be specified.
138
       
If the bedel is something to be delivered to the plaintiff, then it should be 
deliverable and harmless. So a fugitive animal can not be bedel. A column of a building 
can not be bedel, because it will harm others.
139
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 El-Kasani, Bedayi, VI. p. 42 and İbn el-Hümam, Şerhu Feth’il-Kadir, VII. p. 33, 
cited in Yaylalı, Sulh, p. 54.  
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 Yaylalı, Sulh p. 55. 
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 El-Kasani, Bedayi, VI. p.48, cited in Yaylalı, Sulh, pp. 54-55. However, if the sulh 
made upon something that can not be violated, then the plaintiff should claim the bedel, 
as is the case with retaliation (kısas), El-Kasani, Bedayi, VI. 48-54 and İbn el-Hümam, 
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 bey‘-i selem: A contract to deliver at a future time a certain article of sale the price 
being paid down at once, Redhouse, Lexicon, p. 422.  
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 Yaylalı, Sulh, pp 56-57.     
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 El-Kasani, Bedayi, VI. p.48, cited in Yaylalı, Sulh, p. 55. 
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A.3. Halebi (d.956/1552) 
 
 
Mülteka’l-Ebhur appears in complete agreement with the pre-Ottoman Hanafi 
texts on the issue of sulh. Halebi‟s chapter on sulh, however, is a concise one, lacking 
some details in the definition and conditions of sulh mentioned above. As already noted, 
sulh can be similar to sale, rent, or ibrâ, which are treated in separate chapters. 
Furthermore, themes such as homicide, bodily harm, inheritance have separate chapters 
as well. To give an example of issues not dealt in the settlement chapter of Mülteka, we 
can mention the conditions and competency of the musâlih or the conditions regarding 
the explicit utterance for the contract (‘akd) are not dealt with in detail in Mültekâ. 
Halebi talks about the three different types of sulh, ‘an-ikrâr, ‘an-inkâr, and ‘an-
sükût,140 he deals with the topics of sulh in debt (deyn), benefit, retaliation, blood 
money, slavery,
141
 marriage,
142
 inheritance (tehârüc),143 and partnership (müşareket).144 
The last category is more detailed in Mülteka than pre-Ottoman legal texts.145 Halebi, 
however, leaves out the cases in which further evidence emerges after the conclusion of 
sulh ‘an-inkâr.146 
Halebi refers to the conditions of parties to sulh in consistency with the classical 
legal texts. He touches upon the issues pertaining to representation (vekâlet), both 
appointed by the party to the dispute or self-appointed (fuzûlî).147 However he does not 
deal with issues regarding the competency of the parties to sulh, or regarding the 
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 Halebi, III. p.486. 
141
 Halebi, III. p. 491. 
142
 Halebi, III. p.491.  
143
 Halebi, III. pp.501-2. 
144
 Halebi, III. p. 501. 
145
 It should be mentioned that this comparison is based on the secondary literature 
regarding the earlier Hanafi texts. Therefore, the findings are can say as much as the 
secondary literature reflects the content of the classical legal texts.  
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 See above note 80. 
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 Halebi, III. pp.491-92. 
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necessity of îcâb and kabûl and explicit utterance.148 The reason can be the fact that 
these issues have been already discussed in other chapters such as sale.  
Regarding the conditions of musâlahun ‘anh, Mültekâ is in total agreement with 
the classical legal texts. There is only one exception where he asserts that musâlahun 
‘anh can be unknown, without mentioning “as long as it is not required to be given 
back”.149       
About the conditions of bedel, again Halebi follows the rules we find in pre-
Ottoman classical legal texts. For him there are three different types of sulh contracts 
defined according to the nature of bedel: those that can be similar to sale, rent, and ibrâ. 
Here, he deals in detail with cases of conditional ibrâ and sulh.150 Halebi, however, does 
not mention that bedel should be mütekavvim;151 he limits himself to stating that bedel 
should be transferable.
152
 Mültekâ also lacks the situations in which bedel is not present 
at the assembly of sulh (meclis-i sulh).    
 
 
                 
A.4. Abdurrahim (d.1128/1716) 
 
 
The fatwa compilation of Abdurrahim, too, is generally in agreement with 
classical legal texts. The fatwas either approve the already existing points mentioned by 
the classical jurists or elaborate on them applying them to different new cases, as we see 
in the case of cash waqfs (vakf-ı nükûd).153 However, there are some minor points of 
disagreement as well.    
The fatwas of the compilation do not offer a definition of sulh or its different 
types. However, the answers given to the queries appear in agreement with classical 
jurists. For example, when there is some evidence to prove a case in favor of a party in a 
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 See above notes 89-93. 
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 Halebi, III. p.486. 
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 Abdurrahim, p.436. 
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dispute, then the ensuing sulh becomes a sulh ‘an-ikrâr.154 In case of sulh ‘an inkâr, 
Abdurrahim adds that such a sulh does not mean that the defendant approves the claim 
of the plaintiff.
155
 İbrâ is another area that Abdurrahim is in agreement with the 
classical legal texts; here he states that it is the right that is released not the disputed 
article itself (‘ayn).156  
In pre-Ottoman classical texts, it is mentioned that once a valid sulh ‘an-inkâr is 
concluded, it is effective and can not be invalidated even if there is further evidence to 
prove the case in favor of one party.
157
 Abdurrahim, however, invalidates such a sulh 
contract, when some further evidence emerges after the conclusion of the contract.
158
 
Here, it interestingly seems that the şeyhülislam prefers to follow the Maliki tradition of 
el-Haraşi (d.1101/1690)159 rather than the Hanafi tradition.160 In this context, it is very 
natural that Abdurrahim agrees with the classical texts in cases where the defendant is a 
trustee of a minor. In those cases, if there is further evidence in favor of the minor, then 
the sulh is invalidated.
161
 
Conditions of musâlihûn are treated in further detail in the compilation compared 
to the classical texts; however, there is still a general agreement between them. 
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 Abdurrahim, p.444.  
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 Abdurrahim, pp. 440, 455. 
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 See Cengiz Kallek, “Haraşi, Muhammed b. Abdullah,” DİA, XVI. p.110. 
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Ottoman land (he was the first şeyh of al-Azhar University). The similarity between the 
ideas of Ottoman şeyhülislams and that of a Maliki jurist living in the Ottoman land 
would have further implications pertaining to the issue of Ottoman legal homogeneity at 
an intra-madhhab level.    
161
 Abdurrahim, pp. 434, 435, and 442. 
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Abdurrahim agrees that the primary condition for sulh is free consent.
162
 In one case, he 
even further elaborates on a situation in which there is a language barrier. If such a 
barrier prevents the expression of the actual consent of the parties to the sulh, then sulh 
is not valid.
163
 In this context, sulh cases concluded via force majeure (ikrâh) are invalid 
as well.
164
 Abdurrahim goes over the details of what is meant by force. For example, to 
imprison a party means applying force majeure
165
 while to blackmail does not have the 
same meaning.
166
 If illegal force is used against a party before the conclusion of the sulh 
contract but not during the conclusion of the contract, the sulh is valid.
167
  
Regarding the competence of the parties, Abdurrahim concentrates mainly on that 
of the minors. Here again, he follows the general principles mentioned by classical 
jurists. However, he adds one more criterion, and that is the physical appearance of a 
child. If the body of a minor by age resembles that of an adult and the minor claims s/he 
has become adult (baliğ/a), then her/his sulh and ibrâ are valid.168  
Abdurrahim follows the classical jurists regulating the validity of the sulh 
contracts made by minors who are capable of distinction (mümeyyiz) and permitted to 
trade (me’zûn) as long as the contracts bring them absolute benefit.169 Contracts that 
harm the interests of minors are invalid,
170
 and contracts made by incompetent minors 
and insane people are null and void.
171
 Abdurrahim provides a criterion for insanity: it 
should be observable (ma‘hûd) while the contract is concluded. Otherwise, no party can 
claim the invalidity of the sulh contract on the basis of insanity.
172
 
Abdurrahim has many fatwas on conditions of representation (vekâlet), 
guardianship (velâyet), and trusteeship (vesâyet). The primary concern in such fatwas is 
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protecting the interests of the minors.
173
 Abdurrahim adds that waqfs have the same 
status as incompetent individuals. A guardian (mütevelli), therefore, can not make sulh 
that harms the property of a waqf.
174
 
There are further fatwas in Abdurrahim‟s compilation regarding the conditions of 
the representative, all of which are in agreement with the classical legal texts. For 
example, being representative in a dispute does not make one automatically 
representative for sulh regarding that debate;
175
 there is need for the consent of the 
represented person to validate such a sulh.
176
 Here, Abdurrahim adds that when a 
principal releases his representative of his responsibility, the debtor is not released 
automatically;
177
 however, releasing the debtor also renders the representative free.
178
 
The fatwas regarding self-appointed (fuzûlî) representatives follow the classical 
legal texts as well.
179
 Abdurrahim resorts to analogy when answering queries regarding 
similar cases. For example, there are some cases which are not directly about self-
appointed representation but are logically similar to it. In such cases, Abdurrahim does 
not hesitate to apply the regulation of self-appointed representation.
180
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 Zeyd fevt olub veraseti zevcesi Hind’e ve kızı Zeyneb’e münhasıra olmağla terekesini 
beyinlerinde iktisam etdiklerinde Zeynebi’in hissesi mukabelesinde aldığı bir kıta bağa 
Amr müstehak çıkub istihkakını isbat sadedinde iken Zeyneb-i mezbure an-inkar bir 
mikdar akça bedel üzerine Amr ile sulh olub bedel-i sulhu Amr’a vermiş olsa hala 
Zeyneb Amr’a bedel-i sulh deyü verdiği meblağın semenini Hind’den taleb edüb almağa 
kadire olur mu?  
El-cevab: Olmaz. 
In this case, when Amr was found to claim on the garden, both Zeyneb and Hind would 
be parties to that claim. However, Zeyneb makes sulh and gives the bedel without 
informing Hind. Therefore, it resembles fuzûlî representation of Hind on her share. 
According to the classical texts (see above note 102), this sulh is valid only if the 
representative gives the bedel; and s/he does not have the right to claim the bedel from 
müvekkil. Here, Abdurrahim (p.442) responds accordingly.  
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Abdurrahim deals also with the conditions of musâlahun ‘anh in detail, following 
the main principles stated by classical jurists. The main condition that is emphasized in 
the compilation is that the musâlahun ‘anh should be a right that belongs to musâlih.181 
He clarifies this in a fatwa, where he mentions that if evidence exists and is presented to 
prove the position of the defendant and judge also decides accordingly, then the 
claimant does not have any rights regarding the musâlahun ‘anh; therefore, any sulh 
made in this case is invalid.
182
 Abdurrahim agrees also on the principle that musâlahun 
‘anh can be unknown as long as it does not have to be given back.183 
Abdurrahim takes a similar position to the classical jurists regarding the debate on 
ribâ in sulh. If there is concession to be made in a sulh contract, it should be only the 
plaintiff that makes it.
184
 Therefore, if the plaintiff makes a concession in return for 
another concession, the sulh is invalid.
185
  
Abdurrahim takes, however, a stricter position regarding conditional ibrâ. 
According to the classical texts, in certain conditions, in which the defendant does not 
make any concessions, conditional ibrâ can be acceptable.186 Abdurrahim, nevertheless, 
prefers to invalidate any kind of ibrâ involving a condition.187 
Parallel to classical jurists, Abdurrahim states that bedel should be property of the 
musâlih. After the conclusion of a sulh contract, if it is revealed that the bedel belongs 
to a third person, the sulh is null and void.
188
 Retaliation is an exception for Abdurrahim 
as well.
189
 However, for him this exception is not valid in cases of self-appointed 
representation in retaliation disputes.
190
 Furthermore, in homicide cases involving more 
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than one killer, if a sulh is made with one of the attackers, it does not release the others 
from retaliation.
191
 Abdurrahim adds that bedel should not perish or disappear before its 
transfer; otherwise the sulh is null and void.
192
 However, if bedel is counterfeit 
(spurious money), the sulh is valid; but the bedel should be reimbursed.
193
  
The clear result of the scrutiny of the legal principles in Halebi‟s Mülteka and 
Abdurrahim‟s Fetâvâ is the fact that there is legal continuity between the two texts. The 
legal principles regarding the sulh contract after its formation period in the classical 
Islamic period does not go through significant changes in Ottoman 16
th
 and 18
th
 
centuries. The findings of this dissertation indicate a continuing and stable doctrinal 
rigor in Islamic law over centuries. Therefore, it may lead us to the conclusion that, to 
the degree that doctrinal rigor influence legal practice, which was not a low one 
according to Gerber,
194
 Islamic law can be considered as one that tries to regulate the 
actions of the individuals in the society rather than a being legal system that is 
influenced by or even reflects the social norms and practices, as claimed by Rosen.       
 
 
 
B. Ottoman Law: A Court Model or Bargain Model? 
 
 
 
The evidence regarding the concept of sulh in both pre-Ottoman and Ottoman 
legal texts show a high degree of formalism and continuity in the legal system on one 
hand and a high degree of individualism in society on the other. These points, however, 
are subject to debate among the students of law in general and those of Islamic law in 
particular.   
Before dealing with those theoretical debates in the field of Islamic law, one 
significant issue regarding the selected methodology of the existing studies should be 
touched upon. The studies in Ottoman legal history have concentrated so far on the 
function of the court and performance of the kadı, as is the case for the historical studies 
by Haim Gerber, Boğaç Ergene, and Leslie Peirce, among others. In these studies, court 
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registers have been used extensively while fatwas, another important source about 
Ottoman law has not been exploited sufficiently.
195
 This preference of sources is 
understandably a consequence of particular research questions that make the scrutiny of 
sicils more promising. In this respect, however, one should consider the pros and cons 
of each method to be followed. Unlike most of the existing studies on Ottoman law, in 
this thesis fatwa compilations are used as the primary sources. This preference is a 
corollary of an interest mainly in the Ottoman legal doctrines rather than the way they 
were actually practiced in different regions of the Ottoman polity. Furthermore, 
concentrating on legal principles and norms
196
 is more useful to develop a taxonomy for 
Ottoman law, so that case studies on different provinces can be used to test the 
hypotheses provided by such a classification. 
Boğaç Ergene provides positive and negative aspects of presenting classifications 
germane to the Ottoman law. Classifications are useful tools for generalizations. 
Although their capability to characterize the particular is limited, they form frameworks 
within which we can make our observations of the particular.
 197
 In this context, I find it 
useful to refer shortly to the debates related to such classifications in order to clarify the 
argument of this study and its location in the already existing secondary literature on the 
Ottoman law and legal practice. 
The disputes among individuals in a society can be solved in many different ways. 
Weberian formal rational law is only one such way. There are many alternative ways of 
resolving disputes within or without the courts. Usually, the Eurocentric perspective in 
the field of conflict resolution simply divides these solutions into two as legal and 
extralegal according to whether or not they appear in the court.
198
 Sulh, in the first 
glance, resembles the extralegal ways of conflict resolution, i.e. alternative dispute 
resolution (ADR). After all, it involves an agreement reached after a process of 
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negotiation between the disputing parties. However, it is unlike negotiation as an ADR 
mechanism in that the rules and regulations regarding the process and consequences of 
sulh have been scrupulously laid down by law. Therefore, it is very difficult to claim 
that sulh is an extralegal mechanism of conflict resolution. The reason is the fact that 
Islamic law perceives sulh as a contract; and therefore, similar to all other contracts, the 
regulations regarding sulh have been laid out meticulously.  
There is a debate among the students of Ottoman law about the actual activities of 
the kadı court. On one extreme point of the debate stands Haim Gerber who claims that 
the distribution of justice by the Ottoman court involves a procedure very similar to 
what Weber calls „formal rational legal system‟: it is highly predictable, based on very 
clear-cut rules and regulations.
199
 On the other side of this debate we can mention 
Boğaç Ergene, who is skeptical about the Ottoman kadı justice as it has been depicted 
by Gerber. Ergene focuses mainly on the activities of the courts in the provinces of 
Çankırı and Kastamonu and the courts‟ interaction with the community. His 
observations demonstrate the existence of a high degree of “corruption” in the courts. 
Further, he tries to analyze how this corruption was used by the litigants to manipulate 
judicial decisions. He, also, observes that the courts had more than a neutral relationship 
with the communities they were located in through either scribes (kâtibs), deputies 
(na’ibs), or witnesses (şuhûdülhâl). A consequence of this is the reflection of the local 
communal power balance in the courts favoring the powerful and prosperous against the 
weak and the poor. In this debate, Ergene takes side with Lawrence Rosen‟s findings in 
his studies on Moroccan sharia courts. Rosen in a recent study
200
 argues that what 
distinguishes Islamic law from other legal regimes is its capability to remain identifiable 
while accommodating predominant social and cultural pressures.  
Gerber bases his theoretical framework on the critiques of Weber and those he 
calls neo-Weberian scholars, among them especially Lawrence Rosen. Gerber accepts 
the incorporation of customary law into the Ottoman law: he argues that Ottoman law 
was an amalgam of sharia, kânûn, and customs. However, once the rules were 
formulated, they were not negotiated anymore; they were more or less strict and 
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stable.
201
 This is what leads him to harshly criticizing Rosen in his overgeneralization 
about Islamic law as a system in which the kadı does not adjudicate, but simply puts the 
litigants in a position of bargaining for themselves.  
It is possible to consider these opposing perspectives in light of models of conflict 
resolution. Gulliver presents a dichotomy of “judicial process” versus. “political 
process” in conflict resolution.   
By a judicial process I mean one that involves a judge who is vested with both authority 
and responsibility to make a judgment, in accordance with established norms, which is 
enforceable as the settlement of a dispute. … 
The purely political process, on the other hand, involves no intervention by a third party, 
a judge. Here a decision is reached and a settlement made as a result of the relative 
strengths of the two parties to the dispute as they are shown and tested in social action. 
The stronger gains the power to impose its own decisions, but it is limited by the degree 
to which its opponent, though weaker, can influence it. In this case the accepted norms of 
behavior relevant to the matter in the dispute are but one element involved, and possibly 
and unimportant one.
202
 
 
In another study Gulliver offers a classification of the systems of dispute 
settlement according to the type of outcome, i.e. compromise or decision, and the mode 
of settlement, i.e. negotiation or adjudication.
203
 A similar classification is offered by 
Aubert, who comes up with two different models: Court Model and Bargain Model.
204
 
The two models are summarized below: 
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Court Model Bargain Model 
a. Triad a. Dyad 
b. Coercive power b. No coercive power 
c. Application of highly valued norms  c. Pursuit of interests (values) 
d. Establishment of past facts (guilt) d. Not necessary to establish the past facts 
e. Retroactively oriented reasoning e. Prospectively oriented reasoning  
f. Legal experts participate (judge)  f. No legal experts participate 
g. Conclusion is a verdict g. Conclusion is an agreement  
h. Purely distributive decision h. Distributive/generative decision 
i. Either/or decision i. A compromise  
j. Reaffirmation j. No necessary implication concerning validity 
k. Affinity to legal scholarship k. Affinity to science or utilitarian thinking205  
 
Ergene finds Rosen‟s model of Islamic law close to the Bargain Model, since the 
way disputes are settled in Moroccan courts depends on “the types of the disputes, the 
characters of those involved in the case, the nature of the relationships between the 
disputants, and local values and traditions.”206 Therefore for Rosen, justice is but a 
“regulated reciprocity” among members of the community who freely make contracts. 
In this context, mediation and arbitration are the major means to regulate the reciprocity 
among the members of the community.
207
 
Ergene shows Haim Gerber along with some other Ottomanists who base their 
studies on court records
208
 as champions of the Bargain Model. In the court records of 
Çankırı and Kastamonu, Ergene finds information in conformity with the Bargain 
Model,
209
 and he criticizes these scholars for “implicitly ignoring the extra-judicial ties 
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between the provincial courts and the local community.”210 He argues that a further 
concentration on these ties demonstrates that the Ottoman court can be represented by a 
mixture of the elements of both Court Model and Bargain Model.
211
 For example, the 
important roles in judicial processes were not only played by the legal functionaries 
(kadı, na’ib, katib, mufti, etc), but also by some other people who cannot be considered 
as legal experts such as military administrative authorities, nobility, and a group of 
müslimûn (Muslims) functioning as “muslihûn,” i.e. mediators,212 or “şühûd,” i.e. 
witnesses.
213
 Ergene argues that judges did not confine themselves to adjudication 
alone: “they also acted as mediators and arbitrators on various occasions and forced 
opposing parties to settle their differences amicably.”214  
Ergene‟s argument regarding the applicability of the Bargain Model to the 
Ottoman legal system is not unproblematic. The judicial role played by governors was a 
part of their responsibility that was fulfilled in accordance with established legal norms 
and procedures.
215
 Ergene states that court registers are usually silent about the 
important roles played by those who are not members of the court.
216
 He also cites 
Najwa al-Qattan that court records streamline “unique events of human interaction into 
formularies” and, therefore, almost certainly discriminate against selective aspects of 
the processes that took place in the court.
217
 He adds that  
the court records cannot affirm or deny the possibility that kadıs and other members of 
the court participated in negotiations or that people outside the court played active roles 
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in the proceedings. Silence is not denial; it is likely, for example, that at least some of the 
amicable settlements in the court records are the products of – and therefore, muted 
witnesses to – those processes in which kadıs took upon themselves meditative roles.218 
 
Engin Akarlı criticizes Ergene for paying too much attention to sporadic evidence 
for speculation purposes while it is necessary to look for general themes.
219
 Although 
the case of Hans Ulrich Krafft
220
 provides valuable information regarding the different 
ways of judge‟s intervention in the disputes, including mediation, it is very difficult to 
find further similar information to construct a generalization about the Ottoman legal 
system.    
 
 
 
C. Conflict Resolution  
 
 
 
One other field that partakes, though implicitly, in the debates concerning Islamic 
legal system is a group of anthropologists who work on the methods of conflict 
resolution in the Middle East. While the debate about the nature of Islamic law among 
Ottoman legal historians continues, ethnographic studies in the filed of conflict 
resolution conducted in various Muslim societies unanimously support the validity of 
the Bargain Model for processes of dispute resolution in the Middle East. This advocacy 
of the Bargain Model is understandable in light of the academic and normative concerns 
of the scholars. Their main concern has been to emphasize the existence of indigenous 
methods of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) in the Middle East. ADR is defined as 
“those alternatives to the legal system that use a third party intervenor in a non-coercive 
manner,”221 though Avruch and Black add “adjunctive-like” (authoritative third parties, 
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including all forms of arbitration) to the definition as well.
222
 Methods of ADR have 
been well-studied in the Western cultural context. Absence of such works in the Middle 
Eastern context has instigated some scholars to fill this gap.  
   These scholars follow Gulliver in his anthropological study on negotiation for 
dispute settlement among members of the Arusha in Northern Tanzania. The case he 
observes is a way of dispute settlement without recourse to courts, judges, or official 
authority;
223
 i.e. a typical ADR method. Scholars of Islamic conflict resolution are keen 
to follow a similar path. Daniel Smith, who observes the ritual of sulha among the Arab 
Palestinians in the village of Galilee,  states that “The language of jurisprudence and 
adjudication, and therefore the definitions of justice that draw heavily on that language, 
is singularly incapable of providing the appropriate symbolic resources for a peace that 
is socially reconstructive.” (italic original)224 Irani and Funk in their anthropological 
work on reconciliation in Lebanon see sulh as one of the most important “unofficial 
responses” to conflict in the Middle Eastern societies. According to them, the sulh ritual 
which takes place within a communal framework has its origins in tribal and village 
contexts.
225
 Smith defines “sulha” as a ritual that involves mediation efforts, which are 
“strictly dictated by traditional steps.”226 Similarly Antoun, in his study on the tribal 
peasants in Jordan, provides an account of “sulha” as a local ritual of conflict 
resolution.
227
 The definition provided by Abu-Nimer in his comparative study of 
conflict resolution approaches in Western and Middle Eastern contexts is also similar. 
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He sees “solha” as a social ritual that provides a public forum where the settlements 
take place.
228
     
In the field of conflict resolution there are two main camps. One group believes in 
the universality of the methods of conflict resolution, which is exemplified in books 
such as Social Conflict, and Getting to Yes.
229
 The second group believes, however, in 
the existence of distinct methods in different cultural contexts.
230
 These methods should 
be taken into consideration especially when a third party wants to intervene in a conflict 
case to be settled.
231
 
The abovementioned anthropologists working on conflict resolution in the Islamic 
Middle East stand obviously in the second camp. These scholars try to demonstrate the 
inadequacy of the application of Western methods of Conflict Resolution in non-
Western contexts, a concern that is explicitly stated in the majority of these works. 
Antoun notes that “unless attention is given to the often very different cultural foci of 
different societies and the values that underlie such foci, students of conflict resolution 
and politics are unlikely to understand the unfolding process.”232 George Irani and 
Nathan Funk assert that in the Middle East “peacemakers need to draw upon local 
cultural resources and harmonize their practices with Arab-Islamic culture”233 
Abu-Nimer makes a similar statement:  
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“Scholars and practitioners should be aware of, investigate, and understand the existing 
procedures of conflict resolution which have been implemented in the local community. 
In the Middle East, adopting such a perspective means the acceptance and recognition of 
the proposition that Islam and Islamic societies contain beliefs, customs, attitudes, and a 
history which can serve as rich bases for indentifying constructive conflict resolution 
frameworks and processes … Without an examination of local culture and political 
context, there is little opportunity to apply effectively conflict resolution strategies that 
will aid researchers and policymakers in understanding and improving the 
communication between Western and Islamic societies.”234 
 
The concept of sulh has been studied by these anthropologists bearing in mind 
such considerations regarding the differences in the cultural contexts of the West and 
the Middle East and hence, the different methods and processes of conflict resolution. 
Ironically, while trying to emphasize the indigenous methods of conflict resolution in 
the Middle East and, therefore, to criticize the attempts to apply the Western methods in 
the Middle East, these scholars themselves fall in the trap of Orientalism. They base 
their arguments on the fact that West and the Middle East have completely different 
assumptions and perceptions concerning conflict and conflict resolution. One important 
reason for such differences is stated to be the lack of the notion of individualism and 
respect for law in the Middle East. 
Abu-Nimer makes a distinction between the basic assumptions of the West and the 
Middle East. First he emphasizes how law is important in the Western context both for 
the intervening third party and the communities; not only the process of dispute 
settlement but also “the outcomes had to be according to legal procedures.”235 All 
parties perceive the dominance of judicial institutions as legitimate. For example, 
official documents are used and an agreement similar to a legal contract is constructed. 
In the Middle East, however, the parties meet in a public setting with numerous 
witnesses instead of signing papers. Abu-Nimer analyzes this as a strong instrument 
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providing the social influence necessary to guarantee the parties‟ commitment to the 
agreement.
236
 
Abu-Nimer misses the point that it is through oral utterance that contracts are 
formed according to Islamic law, and the testimony of the witnesses is a guarantee for 
the existence of such a contract. It is not a sign of lack of respect for judicial institutions 
or of their legitimacy. Here the issue is just two different ways of perception regarding 
the conclusion and validity of contacts in these two legal systems. Abu-Nimer‟s hasty 
conclusion of his observation shows the necessity of combining anthropological studies 
with knowledge of Islamic law. A similar critique can be posed against historians of 
Ottoman law who do not deal with the theoretical aspects of Islamic law.
237
   
Abu-Nimer goes on with the comparison of rational behavior in the Western and 
the Middle Eastern societies. Westerners assume that the behavior of individuals is 
based on rational calculation and, therefore, the language of emotions and values is 
perceived as an impediment to conducting an agreement.
238
 However, it is spontaneous 
and emotional acts that characterize not only the process of conflict resolution in the 
Middle East but also the Arab society as general, Abu-Nimer argues.
239
 
Fatwas used for this thesis do not support Abu-Nimer. While fatwas are full of 
information about the legal procedure and legal relationships among the individuals 
involved in the disputes, there is no single piece of information regarding the expression 
of the emotions of the parties. Nor does the mufti uses a language of emotions and 
values himself. The language used is absolutely formal legalistic. Although, it is true 
that the queries in the compilations do not reflect original wording of the applicants, 
240
 
the modification of the queries to an absolute formal legalistic form demonstrates the 
legal mentality of the Ottoman judicial system.      
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One more point that Abu-Nimer mentions in his comparison of Western and 
Middle Eastern assumptions is the notion of individualism. In the West, it is the 
individuals who have conflict with one another, and the process of resolution is to serve 
their individual interests. That is why the general public is separated from the 
process.
241
 The aim of conflict resolution in the Middle East, however, is to restore the 
social order. That is how disputes soon escalate in a way to involve entire communities, 
even though they might start between two individuals.
242
 Irani‟s and Funk‟s position is 
similar to Abu-Nimer‟s: “Individuals are considered to be enmeshed in webs of 
relationships that must be preserved; the preservation of social harmony and the 
building of consensus sometimes require individual sacrifices.”243 Therefore, in such 
circumstances, the focus of intervention is not concrete and substantive compensations; 
rather it is the nature of the relationship between the parties.
244
       
Antoun states that the main function of the court, as the locus of the conflict 
resolution in the US, is to “determine guilt and innocence after piling up and assessing 
evidence within the framework of strict rules and an adversarial procedure” while the in 
rural Jordan the focus of conflict resolution is achieving consensus in a forum through 
open-ended give and take, mediation, and the delegation of elders. For him the notions 
of guilt and innocence, winning and losing are totally alien in rural Jordan.
245
   
Communitarianism in the Middle East, according to these studies, is one 
explanation for the observation that sulh is mainly a process of mediation rather than 
negotiation.
246
 However, Islamic legal texts define the concept narrowly as a process of 
negotiation between the disputing parties, recognizing the parties as independent 
individuals. It seems that there is a big gap between the legal meaning of the term and 
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what the anthropologists have observed about the practice in the Middle East. The 
general anthropological observation is that sulh is a ritual through which reconciliation 
takes place.   
Rosen, however repudiates the argument of lack of individualism. He sets the 
individual at the center of social life in the Middle East.
247
 However, he warns that this 
similarity between Moroccan society and western cultures concerning the notion of 
individualism should not mislead one, because individualism in Morocco is based on 
different assumptions and therefore has different implications. In the west, it implies 
“the capacity of each person to fashion his or her own inner self and then to take that 
self and grant it a full range of political and religious support.” In Arab culture, “the 
individual is the unit into which the features of background, context, and association are 
poured and through which the characteristic ways of forming ties to others are played 
out.”248  
Rosen makes an analogy between social life on the one hand and legal practice in 
Morocco on the other. According to him, the individual who bargains in the 
marketplace for every aspect of her life behaves similarly in the law court as well. What 
qadi does is to put the disputants in the position of negotiating for their causes.
249
   
Rosen criticizes the scholars of Islamic law who believe in the lack of a rigorous 
set of logical links among various aspects of the overall body of Islamic law. These 
scholars claim that there is not a general concept of contract around which judges and 
scholars could refine their conceptual categories as logic. Therefore, they think that in a 
situation where rigorous standards and principles are missing, the decision of kadı 
seems to depend simply on his own sense of equity or his personal opinions of the 
matter, which might be prejudicial.
250
  
This lack of doctrinal rigor, however, is not a cause of inconsistency for Rosen. 
According to him scholars who claim the presence of such a deficiency in doctrine miss 
the point that “Islamic law is indeed highly consistent and refined but that it is so not by 
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reference to its own developed doctrines but to the cultural assumptions about 
negotiated social ties.”251 In other words, he modifies the Weberian argument about 
“qadi justice”, which refers to unlimited discretion of the kadı and hence judicial 
arbitrariness, by concentrating on the individualistic nature of the Middle Eastern 
societies and its reflection in courts of law. In such a context, the absence of institutions 
or rigorous doctrines is irrelevant for a smooth and consistent process of legal 
discretion. 
The present study on Islamic classical and Ottoman legal texts demonstrates that 
Islamic law permits the disputants to take the initiative themselves to settle their 
disputes. However, it is not a sign of lack of doctrinal rigor. In contrast, the negotiation 
is put under rigid control of well-defined Islamic legal principles, as presented at the 
first part of this chapter. 
Ottoman fatwas of 18
th
 century contain a lot of detailed information about the 
legal aspects of a dispute to be settled; however, they lack information about the origins 
of the disputants. The fatwas do not contextualize individuals in a web of relationships, 
except for those necessary merely for legal purposes. In other words, there are only 
individuals and their legal relationships in the fatwas, for which some historical 
evidence is provided by a study of Cemal Kafadar, observing rise of individuality and 
decline of group embeddedness from seventeenth century onward.
252
   
Rosen observes that “regularity lies not in the development of a body of doctrine 
which is consistent with other elements of that doctrinal corpus itself, but rather in the 
fit between the decisions of the Muslim judge and the cultural concepts and social 
relations to which they are inextricably tied”253. He is right in stating that the judge‟s 
discretion is not arbitrary and unbounded, however the reason he provides does not fit in 
the Ottoman context. For Rosen, it is the attachment of judge‟s discretion to his world 
that creates a form of consistency and regularity. In the Ottoman context, however, the 
source of consistency and regularity is the existence of well-structured and well-
                                                 
251
 Rosen, The Anthroplogy of Justice, p. 66. 
252
 Cemal Kafadar, 1989, “Self and Others: The Diary of a Dervish in Seventeenth-
Century Istanbul and First-Person Narrative in Ottoman Literature,” Studia Islamica, 
79, pp.121-150. 
253
 Rosen, The Anthropology of Justice, p.18. 
45 
 
established legal principles according to which the disputants and judges have to 
function. 
    
 
 
D. Conclusion 
 
 
 
The Court Model vs. Bargain Model taxonomy is made about the legal practice 
rather than legal doctrine. Ergene mentions that when judge makes decision according 
to Islamic law, this comes close to the Court Model and it is the usage of alternative 
sites as well as the judge‟s action as mediator or arbitrator instead of adjudicator that 
make the Ottoman court more similar to the Bargain Model.  
Gerber thinks that formal legal behavior of the Ottoman courts is the norm; 
therefore for him, Ottoman legal practice was in accordance with the Court Model. At 
the other extreme of the spectrum stands Rosen, who delineates Islamic court as a scene 
for mediation and negotiation rather than adjudication, i.e. a good example of the 
Bargain Model. Rosen bases his argument on the denial of the ontological existence of a 
body of Islamic doctrines. My findings, however, show the existence of a detailed and 
well-structured body of Islamic legal principles which were continuous over centuries. 
Although further studies is required to test the degree of match between the law as 
reveals in the compilations and the legal practice, Gerber observes a high “far-reaching” 
degree of such a match in his study of seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in Bursa and 
Istanbul.
254
     
In response to Ergene‟s point about the correlation between behaving in 
accordance with Islamic law and similarity of the Court Model, my observation 
regarding the concept of sulh demonstrates that behaving according to Islamic law does 
not necessarily mean to be similar to the Court Model. Sulh is within the Islamic law. 
Encouraging making sulh is a sign of the Bargain Model for Ergene, which means not 
behaving exactly according to the Islamic legal principles. However, making sulh is 
allowed by the Islamic law and the rules and regulations about conditions of negotiation 
for settlements are established well in very detail. Therefore, in the Bargain Model, a 
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judge does not have to necessarily step out of the sharia, since Islamic legal principles 
contain both the Bargain Model and the Court Model. Being formal legalistic does not 
necessarily imply that Islamic law and practice are similar to the Court Model; and 
likewise, containing elements of the Bargain Model does not render Gerber‟s argument 
about the formal legalistic nature of Islamic law invalid.      
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
 
 
The primary concern of this chapter is to present a descriptive picture of the 
issues examined in the three fatwa compilations of the eighteenth century: Fetâvâ-yi 
Abdurrahim, Yenişehirli‟s Behcet el-Fetâvâ ma‘an-Nükûl, and Netice el-Fetâvâ ma‘an-
Nükûl, dealing with the major themse covered in the three compilations. Secondarily, as 
in the first chapter, these findings are briefly evaluated in light of the secondary 
literature on Islamic Hanafi law to test the degree of legal consistency between the 
classical texts and the compilations.     
 
 
 
A. An Overview of the Content of the Compilations: 
 
 
 
As mentioned in the first chapter, any legal claim included in hukûk’ul-‘ibâd 
(legal claims of men) can be subject to settlement. Law of transactions, the rules 
governing marriage, family and inheritance, and partially penal law are included in the 
„claims of men‟.255 All these topics, as seen in the Table1, have been dealt with in the 
sulh chapters of fatwa compilations under study, though with different proportions. The 
topics examined consist of two main groups: property related disputes over debt and 
inheritance and disputes over penal matters, i.e. homicide and injury.    
 
Table 1. Thematic Scheme of the Fatwas  
  
debt  iheritance Homicide injury divorce 
Total 
number of 
fatwas 
Netice 17 8 5 1   39 
Abdr. 91 52 33 19 2 73 
Yenş. 22 17 6 4   235 
Total 130 77 44 24 2 347 
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Table 1 shows the thematic description of the fatwas in the compilations.
256
 The 
major theme dealt with is disputes related to debt, followed by inheritance. Cases 
involving penal law also form a considerable section in the sulh chapters of the 
compilations under study. However, cases of family law, including divorce, do not 
occur frequently as subjects of settlement in the compilations. The remaining fatwas are 
mainly about legal principles themselves rather then different topics of dispute, dealing 
with, for example, the conditions of the validity of a settlement upon denial or cases of 
representation to make settlement on behalf of a minor.          
 
 
 
A.1. Sulh ‘an-inkâr Controversy 
 
 
“The most esteemed settlement is the one  
made upon repudiation.” 
Abu Hanifa
257
 
 
 
Before embarking on a detailed examination of the themes dealt with in the 
compilations, it is useful to bring to light a legal debate over one particular form of 
settlement: sulh ‘an-inkâr. As mentioned ealier, the way the defendant responds to the 
accusation defines three types of settlement:: concessional settlement (sulh ‘an-ikrâr), 
settlement upon denial (sulh ‘an-inkâr), and settlement upon silence (sulh ‘an-sükût). 
 
Table 2. Types of settlements based  
on the reaction of the defendant 
  an-inkar an-ikrar an-sükût 
Total 
number of 
fatwas 
Netice 6 2 0 39 
Abdrurrahim 48 15 0 73 
Yenişehirli 16 3 0 235 
Total 70 20 0 347 
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In the three compilations under study (Table 2), there are 20 fatwas on 
settlement upon concession, 70 on settlement upon denial, and none on settlement upon 
silence.
258
 These figures show the queries in which the terms „‘an-inkâr‟ and „‘an-ikrâr‟ 
are explicitly mentioned, but certainly, the number of concessional settlements is quite 
higher, since in many instances, unless otherwise stated, the case is taken as a settlement 
upon concession. One example can be seen in a fatwa of Abdurrahim: 
 
Zeyd claims Amr owes him some amount of money. Zeyd asks for the money. If Amr 
says “let‟s make settlement upon this portion of the mentioned amount” does it indicate 
concession on Amr‟s part regarding the mentioned debt? Answer: Yes.259   
        
There are also a significant number of cases of settlement upon denial. There is a 
debate among the jurists concerning this type of settlement. Settlement upon denial 
happens when the defendant refuses the plaintiff‟s claim and neither of the parties has 
evidence to prove their case. The parties reach a settlement so that the defendant pays a 
bedel to the plaintiff and the dispute is over. Legally, the defendant can set herself free 
simply by taking an oath. But in a considerable number of the cases (70 cases, i.e. 20 
percent) settlements are based on the refutation of the claim by the defendant. The 
question to be answered is why the defendant accepts to pay such a bedel even though 
there is no evidence to support the plaintiff‟s claim.  
Schools of law are divided on the issue of settlement upon denial. While the 
Shafiis are totally against such contracts, the Maliki, Hanbali, and Hanafi jurists rule for 
their validity. The legal methodological debate over the issue exceeds the scope of this 
study.
260
 However, it is important to mention the different attitudes towards law and 
ethics which lead the jurists to become for or against the settlement upon denial. If 
adhering to legal norms and justice is the prominent concern, then settlements upon 
denial can be opposed, because it would lead to unfair enrichment of one party. On the 
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other hand, if establishing social harmony and ending the extant disputes is the primary 
concern, then settlement upon denial can be used as a significant tool to reach that aim. 
Aida Othman summarizes the debate between these two approaches: “that of forgiving 
and setting aside the misunderstanding and mistakes of the other in favor of restoring 
harmony; and that of ensuring the lawfulness of gain as well as preventing the unjust 
enrichment of an untruthful party.”261  
 Therefore, the answer to the question above, namely why the settlements upon 
denial should take place, may be that the importance attached to the restoration of social 
harmony was higher than establishing precise justice. The fact that appearance at court 
was perceived as something dishonrabe, especially for the people of high status,
262
 
might form another explanation for the acceptability of settlement upon denial or 
because they want to settle the dispute as soon as possible.
263
 Looking at the absolute 
and irreversible validity of the sulh ‘an-inkâr in the Hanafi classical texts, these 
explanations seem reasonable. A defendant, who believes she is right in a dispute, and 
who does not go to the court and instead accepts to pay a bedel for the settlement she 
reaches with the plaintiff, should have concerns more important than mere justice when 
she knows that the settlement will not be reversed.     
However, the Ottoman şeyhülislams studies here prefer a different attitude 
regarding this legal issue, which necessitates alternative explanations for repudiation 
settlements in the Ottoman context. Yenişehirli and Netice compilations follow 
Abdurrahim‟s compliance with the Maliki el-Haraşi‟s tradition, rather than that of 
Hanafi classical jurists in invalidating repudiated settlement contracts after further 
evidence was provided by either of the parties.  
 
  
Zeyd dies and, Amr, the grandson of his father‟s uncle is the only heir who gets all the 
bequest. Then Bekr emerges and claims to be son of Zeyd‟s uncle‟s father. Amr 
repudiates and Bekr does not have any proof for his claim. They make a settlement on 
some of the rights claimed by Bekr [as bedel]. If, later, Bekr proves his claim, does the 
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settlement get invalidated and can Bekr take his share of the bequest from Amr? Answer: 
Yes.
264
 
 
 
The abundance of such cases where a repudiation settlement contract is 
invalidated after emergence of further evidence by either of the parties may demonstrate 
the fact that in the Ottoman society, the repudiation settlement had a function broader 
than the mere maintenance of the social harmony or avoidance of the disgrace of 
showing up in a court. The legal preference of the Ottoman jurists made it possible to 
use repudiation settlement as a strategy to gain time for either of the parties. A plaintiff, 
who does not have any proof, does not hesitate to make a repudiation settlement even if 
she is sure that she is right. In the future, if she can not find any proof, the bedel she 
receives will be a gain anyway. If she will be able to prove her case, then she will have 
the opportunity to present the evidence and invalidate the original settlement contract. 
The same is true on the defendant‟s side. If, for the defendant, the maintenance of social 
harmony is one reason for agreeing to a repudiation settlement, the fact that she will 
have the right to provide further evidence in the future is a further encouragement to 
partake in such settlements. 
This attitude of Ottoman şeyhülislams demonstrates how seeking and applying 
the attainable evidence was significant in the Ottoman legal system, which makes 
Ottoman law closer, as Gerber claims, to formal legalistic type. While restoring social 
harmony is one important goal of the pre-modern legal systems, as is shown by Abu-
Nimer and Irani and Funk in their studies in the Middle Eastern context,
265
 Ottoman law 
emphasized attaining justice based on facts at least as much as restoring social harmony.        
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A.2. Debt: 
 
 
Financial disputes over debt are the most frequent cases in the sulh chapters of 
the three compilations. Among the total number of 347 fatwas regarding sulh in the 
compilations, 116 fatwas (33%) concern debt disputes (Table3). Almost all of these 
fatwas are cash-related; only in two fatwas cash is not mentioned at all. An 
overwhelming majority of these fatwas (87%) are absolutely cash-based disputes in 
which either the bedel is cash as well, or the disputed amount of cash is released (ibrâ). 
Only in 13 fatwas there are non-cash elements including real-estate, and other properties 
such as wheat, rice, cloth, and animal. Even in the majority of these cases, the non cash 
properties are bedel for cash disputes. There are only three fatwas where the disputed 
item is not cash.    
 
Table 3: Disputed items in debt cases  
  cash real-estate 
other 
property 
Total 
number of 
debt cases 
Netice 16 1 0 17 
Abdurrahim 78 5 1 79 
Yenişehirli 20 3 3 20 
Total 114 9 4 116 
 
 
As pointed out in the first chapter, any details, which are legally unnecessary, 
about the context of the disputes are left out. Netice and Yenişehirli never mention the 
amount of the money involved in a debt dispute. Abdurrahim‟s compilation, however, 
has some examples whereby the amount disputed and paid for a settlement is specified. 
The amounts Abdurrahim cites range from 10,000 gold coins
266
 to 80 guruş.267 This 
information can be a sign of the availability of the capital‟s fatwa institution for people 
of a wide range of prosperity.  
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Sale is considered a prototype for all transactions,
268
 including sulh. However, 
the information in the sulh chapters of the compilations shows that most of the cases are 
similar to ibrâ, rather than to sale. In other words, for example in most of debt cases 
both musalahun ‘anh and bedel are cash. In those cases, the only way to make sulh is 
through the concession made by the plaintiff, which is considered as a form of ibra. In 
some cases, one item is exchanged for another, for example cash for real estate. These 
cases are perceived as similar to sale.  
The debt cases in the compilations deal with issues such as conditions for the 
validity of settlement; issue of further evidence in the settlements upon denial; 
conditional release; and inheritance. The cases about the conditions of the validity of 
settlement depict the general framework of the legal principles, mentioned in the first 
chapter. In the compilations under study, issues dealt with in regard to the conditions of 
validity are usage of force (ikrâh), the right to annul the contract in case the bedel is 
deficient (hıyar-ı ‘ayb), the ruin of the bedel, interest (ribâ), representation (vekâlet), 
and competence (ehliyet). Legally, these cases follow both pre-Ottoman classical legal 
texts as well as Halebi‟s Mülteka.  
One more issue that was dealt with was issue of tapu, upon which settlement is 
invalid. 
 
Zeyd has lent some money to Amr. In lieu of this amount of money, Amr wants to make 
settlement with Zeyd and give up a farm under his possession as bedel to Zeyd. Is such a 
sulh valid? Answer: No.
269
   
 
The rationalization (şerh) provided here states “settlement is valid on any thing 
whose sale is valid and it is invalid on anything whose sale is invalid such as pork, 
wine, etc.”270 It is in line with Abdurrahim‟s fatwa on this issue, forbidding sulh on the 
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right of possession of tapu.
271
 We see here an example of ictihâd, where the jurists 
resort to analogy to rule on new issues.  
Conditional release (ibra) is another controversial issue. The position taken by 
these three Ottoman şeyhülislams is neither the same as the position of the pre-Ottoman 
classical jurists nor that of Halebi in Mülteka. These compilations annul any kind of 
conditional release.
272
 However, one striking point of inconsistency has been observed 
between a fatwa issued by Yenişehirli and one appearing in Netice regarding a release 
with a condition of doing something. Yenişehirli does not distinguish this situation from 
other cases of conditional release and proclaims it as invalid.
273
 However, a fatwa by 
Muhammed Piri-Zade in Netice presents a different attitude: 
 
Zeyd tells his debtor Amr that if he does something that Zeyd wants, he will be released 
of the debt. However, Amr does not do the job and that affair disappears. Zeyd asks Amr 
to pay his debt. Can Amr refuse paying based on the mentioned release? Answer: No.
274
  
 
The reason for the invalidation of the fatwa could be either a) the existence of 
conditional release that would be invalidated anyway, or b) Amr‟s failure to perform 
what Zeyd had posed as condition. In the latter case, conditional release would have 
been accepted as valid. Fortunately, that information is provided in the rationalization 
section. It is mentioned clearly that there is an exception: if the condition stipulates 
someone an action, for example that of someone should carry something, then the 
release is valid.
275
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 Zeyd Amr zimmetinde olan şu kadar akça hakkından Amr’ı ibra eder oldukda Amr 
filan fi’li işlersen meblağı mezburdan seni ibra etdim deyü bu vecihle ibra eylese sahih 
olur mu? El-cevab: Olmaz. 
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 Zeyd şu kadar akça medyunu Amr’a falan maslahatımı görürsen meblağ-ı 
mezburdan seni ibra etdim deyüb lakin Amr asla ol maslahatı görmeyüb maslahat fevt 
olsa Zeyd meblağ-ı mezburu Amr’dan taleb etdikde Amr ibra-i mezbura binaen 
vermemeğe kadir olur mu? El-cevab: Olmaz. Netice, p.433. 
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A.3. Inheritance: 
   
 
Inheritance is the second largest category in the fatwa compilations.
276
 Fatwas 
regarding inheritance deal with issues such as the conditions of the validity of 
settlement on the inheritance right, including cases in which the bedel is owned by a 
third party, the appearance of interest (ribâ) in the settlement contract, lack of intention 
to make a settlement, the cases of unknown musâlahun ‘anh, release from ‘ayn, or the 
use of blackmail to exclude a party from her right to inheritance, as in the following 
fatwa by Abdurrahim: 
 
Hind dies and leaves her husband, Zeyd, and her daughter, Zeyneb, as heirs. Zeyd 
appropriates the entire bequest. Amr marries Zeyneb. Zeyd tells Zeyneb to acknowledge 
that she has received her share of the bequest and release her right; otherwise, he would 
not let her go to her husband. If Zeyneb admits the reception of her share and releases her 
right can Zeyneb still claim her share in her mother‟s bequest? Answer: Yes.277 
   
This fatwa is significant to show the attitude of the Ottoman muftis to preserve 
the property rights of the individuals. The şeyhülislam issues the fatwa to secure the 
interest of the daughter, invalidating the release because it is not based on her free will. 
There is another type of fatwa which is also issued to secure the rights of the heirs, in 
this instance, those of people who are about to die. If a person has terminal illness, any 
release or legacy affecting more than one third of the entire bequest is invalid.
278
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 In the court registers of eighteenth century Trabzon, however, the settlement cases 
for inheritance form the overwhelming majority of the entire settlemet cases. 
Koyunkalın, “Sulh,” p.16.  
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 Hind fevt olub zevci Zeyd’i ve kızı Zeyneb’i terk eyledikde tereke-i Hind’in cümlesini 
Zeyd kabz edüb badehu Amr Zeyneb’i tezevvüc eyledikde Zeyd Zeyneb’e validenden 
filan hisseni kabza ikrar ve zimmetimi ibra etmedikce zevcine salıvermem demekle 
Zeyneb dahi ol-vecih üzere ikrar ve zimmeti ibra eylese hala Zeyneb validesinden intikal 
eden malını Zeyd’den taleb edüb almağa kadire olur mu? El-cevab: Olur. Abdurrahim, 
p.447.  
278
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Zeyd bequeaths his son‟s son one third of his estate, after which he dies. Can Zeyd‟s heir 
disobey the legacy? Answer: No.
279
   
 
The main issue dealt with in the inheritance-related fatwas is exclusion, i.e. 
tehârüc which is defined as “withdrawal of one or more heirs from the bequest in return 
for a part of their share or some other thing.”280 Fatwas in the three compilations 
considered here show explicitly that release from the right of inheritance is invalid, 
because such right is absolute and compulsory.
281
 However, a person can make 
settlement on this right and receive some bedel in return. A number of exclusion-related 
fatwas are about the conditions of the validity of such settlements,
282
 representation,
283
 
and the issue of the free will of the parties to the settlement. 
 The majority of exclusion fatwas are about guaranteeing the rights and interests 
of the excluded:  
 
The bequest of the deceased Zeyd involves real-estate, cash, and non-cash property. Amr, 
one of the heirs, is excluded by the rest of the heirs in return for 5,000 akça. In case the 
bedel received by Amr is less than his cash share in the bequest, is such a 
settlement valid? Answer: No.284 
 
The amount an excluded heir receives as bedel can not be less than her share in 
one of the items of the bequest.
285
 The cases of inheritance have a larger portion of non-
cash property and real estate than debts, as seen in the Table 4. For example a deceased 
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 Zeyd süls-ü malını oğlunun oğlu Amr’a vasiyet etdikden sonra mısran fevt olsa 
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 Terekesi akar ve nükud ve uruz olan Zeyd-i müteveffanın veresesi içlerinden Amr’a 
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person leaves cash and real-estate as bequest. The share the excluded heir receives 
should not be less than her share in either of the cash or real-estate property.  
 
 
 
        Table 4. Disputed items in inheritance cases 
  
cash 
real-
estate 
other 
properties 
Total number 
of inheritance 
cases 
Netice 5 1 1 8 
Abdurrahim 23 12 16 52 
Yenişehirli. 5 2 2 17 
Sum 33 15 19 77 
 
 
Similarly, if the deceased has some outstanding credit to be collected, exclusion 
can not take place until the loan has been received and added to the bequest, from which 
exclusion will take place.
286
  
 
The deceased Zeyd has loans on people. Can rest of the heirs make a settlement with an 
heir, Amr, and exclude him, giving him some cash [as bedel] while the loans would 
belong to the rest of the heirs? Answer: No.
287
  
 
Another measure to guarantee the interests of the excluded is explicitly 
demonstrated in cases where the deceased is indebted. In that case, exclusion can take 
place only if the excluder(s) guarantee to pay the debt of the deceased. Otherwise, if the 
excluded is asked to pay the debt of the deceased, or if the fate of the debt is left in 
obscurity, then the settlement is invalid.  
Guaranteeing the rights of the excluded can be seen in conformity with the 
general attitude of the Islamic law in securing the rights and interests of the 
disadvantaged within the limits of its given social universe, i.e. without given limits of 
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 Yaylaı, p.119. 
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 Zeyd-i müteveffanın zimem-i nasda akçası var iken verese içlerinden Amr’a zimemde 
olan düyûn kendilerin olmak üzere bir mikdar akça verüb ala tarik’it-teharüc Zeyd’in 
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social inequality. The excluded person in the settlement on the inheritance is already in 
a disadvantageous position; so the law tries to prevent any further defraudation. The 
same position is taken while dealing with the rights of minors as in the following fatwa.  
 
Zeyd dies and leaves his minor wife and others as heirs. Other heirs appropriate the entire 
bequest and make an extortionate settlement (gabn-i fahiş ile) with the minor‟s father in 
return for some money. Is such a settlement valid? Answer: No.
288
 
 
A significant number of inheritance-related fatwas are based on repudiation, 
which can be divided into two groups. The first group contains queries about presenting 
further evidence after a repudiation settlement. The answers to these queries are 
consistent in all related fatwas. Repudiation in inheritance cases, among others, can be 
used not only as a means of restoring social harmony but also as a strategy of gaining 
time.
289
 There is a second group of repudiation cases:  
 
The deceased Zeyd leaves his two sons, Amr and Bekr, as the only heirs. Amr and Bekr 
claims that a ship, which is under Bishr‟s control, is Zeyd‟s property. Bishr repudiates, 
saying it is his own property. Amr, however, makes a settlement with Bishr upon his 
alleged right in the ship in return for some money and receives the bedel. Bekr, on the 
other hand, does not make a similar settlement. Can Bekr claim to have a right in the 
bedel received by Amr? Answer: No.
 290
   
    
Such cases resemble settlement in partnership (müşareket): when a partner 
makes a repudiation settlement on her share, the bedel she receives can not be claimed 
by other partners.  
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 “Zeyd fevt olub zevcesi Hind-i sagireyi ve sair-i veresesini terk etdikde tereke-i 
Zeyd’in cümlesini sair-i verese kabz edüb badehu sagirenin babası Amr, sagirenin 
hissesinden gabn-i fahiş ile şu kadar akça üzerine sulh olsa sulh-ı mezbur sahih olur 
mu? El-cevab: Olmaz.” Yenişehirli, p. 448. 
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 Zeyd’i müteveffanın hısran varisleri oğulları Amr ve Bekr, Bişr’in yedinde olan 
sefine için Zeyd’in mülküdür deyü dava ve Bişr benim mülkümdür deyü inkar edüb 
yalnız Amr sefine-yi mezbureden hissesinden şu kadar akça üzerine sulh ve kabz-ı bedel 
edüb Bekr sulh olmasa Bekr bedel-i mezbureden Amr’a müşarekete kadir olur mu? El-
cevab: Olmaz.Yenişehirli, p.442. 
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A.4. Homicide and Injury  
 
 
Retribution is prescribed for you in cases of killing … But if something of a murderer‟s 
guilt is remitted by his brother this should be adhered to in fairness, and payment be made 
in a goodly manner.”291 
 
As mentioned above, for a dispute to be subject to settlement, it has to involve 
the legal claims of men. Where the claims of God are concerned, no one has the 
permission to make a settlement.
292
 There is a third category, however: disputes 
involving both rights of God and rights of men. In this latter situation, regulations that 
apply to the predominant element, either the rights of God or rights of men, are valid. 
Homicide and injury are in this third category. On the one hand, they involve humans 
who have been harmed or killed, so there exists the right of retaliation. On the other, 
they are among the hukûk’ul-lah, because restriction of such penal crimes is in the 
benefit of the political community.
293
 The legal question to be asked is in which cases 
settlement is valid for homicide and injury. Classical jurists consider homicide and 
injury as disputes in which the rights of men are predominant,
294
 therefore they rule for 
the validity of settlement.
295
 However, since intentional and unintentional homicide and 
injury have different legal consequences, settlements made upon each signify some 
differences as well.  
The principal (aslî) punishment for intentional homicide is retaliation (kısâs). 
The heirs of the deceased person, however, have the right to forgive the murderer(s) or 
make a settlement in return for some bedel. This last option can only take place, 
according to the Hanafi as well as Maliki law, by the consent of the attacker.
296
 This 
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seems to be one reason for the overrepresentation of intentional homicide cases in sulh 
chapters, because sulh is only another way of naming the last option mentioned above, 
i.e. asking for financial consideration with the consent of the defendant.   
However, unlike cases of unintentional killing, there is no set diyet for cases 
involving retaliation. Therefore the bedel,
297
 in settlements can be any amount, more or 
less than the diyet specified in law for unintentional killing.
298
  
 
Zeyd murders Amr, which necessitates retaliation [i.e. it is intentional]. Zeyd makes 
settlement with Amr‟s heirs giving bedel being 2,000 guruş. Later, Zeyd claims that since 
the bedel is more than diyet, the additional amount of bedel is invalid. Can he take the 
additional amount? Answer: No.
299
  
 
If one heir makes settlement with the murderer, the right of retaliation drops for 
other heirs, but they have the right to take diyet.
300
  
 
Zeyd and Amr together killed Bekr using an injuring tool. Bekr‟s heirs are exclusively his 
wife Hind and his minor daughter Zeyneb and his brother‟s son Bishr. Zeyd and Amr 
make settlement with the mentioned Bishr on the dispute of retaliation in return for some 
cash [as bedel]. Can the mentioned Hind demand retaliation against Zeyd and Amr? 
Answer: No.
301
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 It should be noted that in the cases of intentional homicide, the terms diyet and bedel 
are used interchangeably. The term diyet, whose amount is specified by the sharia, will 
be further elaborated below.      
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 Zeyd ve Amr alet-i cariha ile me’an Bekr’i amden carh ve katl etdiklerinden sonra 
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olur mu? El-cevab: Olmaz, diyetden hissesini alur. Abdurrahim, p.452. 
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This kind of settlement is observed frequently in the compilations.
302
 There are 
less than ten cases in which the murderer escapes from retaliation. In one case the heirs 
of the murdered forces (ikrâh) the murderer for a settlement. While the bedel asked in 
such a settlement should not be paid to the heirs since force settlement is invalid, the 
retaliation can not take place either.
303
 In a more interesting case, the heirs of the 
murdered are forced for a settlement. Even though the heirs provide evidence for the 
fact that the settlement has been made via use of force, they can not claim the blood 
(retaliation) of the murdered person: 
  
Zeyd and Amr claim that Halid has intentionally murdered their testator, Bishr. Halid, 
after denial, uses force to makes a settlemen with the said Zeyd and Amr for the 
mentioned claim on some cash [as bedel], and has [Zeyd and Amr] get the said amount of 
cash under duress. After Zeyd and Amr prove legally that the settltment was done under 
duress in the way written [above], can they claim the mentioned murdered person, Halid‟s 
blood? Answer: No.
 304
   
 
This can be a sign of the negative attitude of the Ottoman jurists regarding the 
application of retaliation, using every opportunity to limit its practice, parallel to the 
early Islamic law‟s attitude prohibiting the pre-Islamic tradition of blood feud and at the 
same time recommending the heirs of the intentionally murdered person to waive their 
right to retaliation.
305
 However, this does not mean that the Ottoman muftis abolished 
retaliation as a rule. There is one case in which the mufti rules for the continuation of 
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 Zeyd Amr’ı alet-i carihe ile amden katl etdikden sonra veresesi Zeyd’e kısasdan 
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the heirs‟ right to retaliate even after a settlement. This is a settlement, however, made 
by an unauthorized representative (fuzûlî).306    
In cases when a group of people murder a person and the heirs of the deceased 
person make settlement with one of the murderers, the heirs‟ right to retaliate other 
murderers continues.
307
 In the fatwa compilations, there are three cases that confirm to 
this ruling of the classical jurists
308
:  
Zeyd and Amr and Bekr intentionally hit and killed Bishr using an injuring tool. The heirs 
claimed against the mentioned people and proved their claim. Zeyd makes a settlement 
with the Bishr‟s heirs giving them some cash [as bedel]. Does the fact that the heirs had 
made settlement with Zeyd drop the retaliation from Amr and Bekr? Answer: No.
309
    
 
The pre-Ottoman Hanafi texts and Halebi‟s Mülteka have a similar position 
regarding the situation where there are some minors or insane people among the heirs. 
In those cases, the competent heirs can ask for the retaliation of the murderer, and 
hence, have the right to make a settlement with the perpetrator as well.
310
 In these cases, 
the insane or the minor heirs‟ right to retaliate drops. However, they will have the right 
to get their share of diyet.
311
 If all the heirs are minors, then their guardians (velîs) can 
make settlement instead of them. The rule here is that the settlement should not harm 
the interest of the minors. The amount of the bedel should not be less than the diyet, 
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unless the proof of intentional homicide is impossible.
312
 In line with earlier Hanafi 
jurists, Ottoman şeyhülislams recognize the guardians‟ right to make a settlement and 
display similar sensitivity to protect the rights of the minors:  
 
Zeyd commits homicide against Amr, which necessitates retaliations [i.e. it is 
intentional]. Amr leaves his minor son Bekr as the only heir. Bishr, the guadian (vasî) of 
Bekr makes settlement with Zeyd upon the intentional homicide in return for a bedel less 
than diyet. When the minor becomes adult, can he ask for the entire amount of Amr‟s 
diyet? Answer: Yes.
313
      
 
Parallel to the importance attached to the distinction between cases that involve 
intention and those that do not, in the fatwa compilations, the term “intentionally” 
(‘amden) is very explicitly mentioned for cases of intentional homicide. Alternative 
ways to refer to intention can be “homicide dispute which necessitates retaliation” 
(mûcib-i kısâs olan dâ‘vâ-yı katl) or simply “retaliation dispute” (dâ‘vâ-yı kısâs). Other 
auxiliary words to mention the tool used and, therefore, to support the idea of intention 
are utilized in most of these cases. 
While the rule for intentional homicide is very clear, the terms under which 
intention takes place is a matter of dispute between the Hanafi jurists. The jurists agree 
on the fact that the use of a tool to kill a person is a vivid sign of the existence of 
intention. However, there is also the question of what tool is regarded as indicative of 
the involvement of intention. While Abu Yusuf (d.798) and Shaibani (d.805) have a 
broad understanding of „tool‟, i.e. the weapons that would normally result in death, Abu 
Hanifa (d.767) limited the meaning of the „tool‟ to a sharp weapon or instrument that 
could cut through the body.
314
 
Halebi‟s attitude is one of impartiality when there is lack of consistency among 
the three prominent Hanafi imams. In such cases, he simply presents the different 
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arguments; therefore, he is not among the Ottoman jurists
315
 who obey the strong 
opinion, i.e. that of Abu Hanifa, as is the norm in the Ottoman legal system.
316
 This 
norm, however, is followed in the fatwa compilations. The majority of the cases 
mention the use of an injuring/wounding tool (âlet-i câriha). The two tools mentioned 
fit the position of Abu Hanifa: spear and gun.
317
  
Cases of unintentional killing are referred to as “homicide dispute which 
necessitates diyet” (mûcib-i diyet olan dâ‘vâ-yı katl). In the compilations under study, 
the shares of unintentional homicide cases is very small compared to intentional 
homicide. Among the total number of 45 fatwas pertaining to homicide disputes, only 
four fatwas (nine percent) are about unintentional homicide, while in 34 fatwas (76 
percent) it is explicitly mentioned that the dispute is about intentional homicide. In the 
remaining cases, the element of intention is not specified.  
Unintentional homicide is punished by diyet, which is defined by Al-Babarti as 
“the property (mâl) taken in return for the life of a murdered person in homicide crimes 
or for the organ cut from a person‟s body in injury crimes.”318 This definition should be 
extended to cover many forms of wounds not leading to amputation, such as me’mûme 
(a head wound laying bare the cerebral cavities,) câ’ife (a wound in the body that 
reaches one of the inner cavities), münakkıle (a wound whereby a bone is displaced) 
mûdıha (a wound that lays bare the bone.)319 Halebi provides a further detailed list of 
the wounds and harms that necessitate diyet.
320
  
For unintentional homicide and injury, diyet is the principal (aslî) punishment.321 
The amount to be paid is determined by the sharia. A settlement can take place on this 
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specific amount; therefore, in line with the general logic of settlement, the bedel can be 
less, but not more than the diyet. Any amount more than diyet is perceived as interest, 
and therefore such settlement is considered invalid. For intentional homicide and injury, 
diyet is a substitution punishment (bedelî), since it substitutes the principal punishment 
for intended homicide or injury, i.e. retaliation. The heirs of the person who is murdered 
intentionally can make settlement with the murderer(s), as shown above, so that the 
heirs receive diyet, which is also considered as bedel for the settlement. The amount of 
this diyet can be either higher or lower than the amount specified by the sharia. Thus, 
the straightforward rule regarding unintentional homicide can be one explanation for the 
underrepresentation of such cases in the compilations. The amount of diyet is pre-
determined by the sharia and relevant settlements are made upon this specific amount, 
while in intentional homicide cases, the settlement does not involve a specific amount, 
but a right, namely, retaliation.  
While in the earlier Hanafi law, the general attitude towards the involvement of 
intention in homicide and injuring was similar, one condition was mentioned for 
retaliation of injury: The retaliation should be exactly equivalent to the original bodily 
harm.
322
 This condition renders many intentional injuries practically impossible to 
retaliate, which is clearly reflected in the Ottoman fatwa compilations under study as 
well. In most cases of harm, it is not explicitly mentioned whether or not intention is 
involved. Only in three of the total number of 24 cases, it is explicitly mentioned that 
the injuries were effected intentionally, and only in two of them, lack of intention is 
stated clearly. In most of the rest, one finds pieces of information implying the existence 
of intention: for example either the tool used is mentioned, [such as a baton (değnek), 
knife, gun, or axe], or the action of attack is specified, [such as “a fist in the chin” or 
simply “beating” (darb etmek.)] While it can be understood that the cases of intentional 
bodily harm constitute an overwhelming majority, not stating it explicitly may be a sign 
of the fact that, in practice, intention was not a decisive factor in determining the penal 
process in bodily harm cases.  
A considerable number (46%) of bodily harm cases are about the ensuing 
damage after the original injury caused by the perpetrator. If the settlement is made for 
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the original injury and not for its consequences, the perpetrator is held responsible for 
the ensuing harm as well.
323
 
     
Zeyd after injuring Amr with gun makes settlement with him only for that harm in 
return for some cash [as bedel]. If Amr dies because of that injury, can his heirs 
ask Zeyd for the entire diyet? Answer: Yes.
324
 
 
Another issue that is dealt with frequently in the fatwas is related to the healing 
of the harm caused by a perpetrator. After the perpetrator makes a settlement with an 
injured person, if the wound heals completely, the bedel received by the injured person 
should be reimbursed.  
 
Zeyd hit Amr with baton and injured his eye. Zeyd made settlement with Amr for this 
harm in return for some cash [as bedel]. After the transfer of the bedel, Amr‟s eye healed 
and no impact of the harm remained. Can Zeyd claim back the amount he had paid as 
bedel to Amr? Answer: Yes.
325
   
     
Here again, the general attitude of the Ottoman jurists can be followed in debates 
among the three prominent imams of the Hanafi school.
326
 While Abu Yusuf argues for 
the necessity of diyet for pain and Shaibani rules for payment for the medication, Abu 
Hanifa‟s position is against any kind of diyet in case of healing.327 The şeyhülislams of 
18
th
 century adhere exactly to this latter position.   
One more question to be answered is how it is possible to make settlement for 
disputes on injuries which do not lead to diyet. The answer lies in another concept, tazir, 
i.e. discretionary punishment by the kadı, rather than in diyet.  
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Zeyd reviles Hind so that tazir is required. Zeyd makes settlement with Hind for 
tazir in return for some cash [as bedel]. After the transfer of the bedel, can Zeyd 
demand reimbursement of the bedel based on the invalidity of the settlement? 
Answer: No.
328
  
    
Tazir or hükûmet ‘adl is defined as “disciplining (te’dîb) or punishment (ceza) 
for crimes that do not have a specific punishment in sharia.”329 Halebi mentions some 
cases where hükûmet ‘adl, i.e. discretion by the judge should take place.330 An 
important question is what kinds of crimes were punished by tazir in Ottoman society. 
The answer to this question would provide information regarding the ictihâd of the 
Ottoman jurists, since it shows the attempt of the jurists to interfere in the grey areas 
which have not been dealt previously. There are two cases which explicitly mention that 
settlement is done for tazir. In these cases, it is clear that hitting and reviling someone 
leads to tazir. In view of the definition of diyet and tazir, it apperas that some other 
cases regarding injury are settlements for tazir rather than diyet, even though it is not 
explicitly stated that they are so. 
 
Zeyd fists his wife Hind in the chin and wounds her. Hind makes settlement with Zeyd 
for that wound and the ensuing consequences in return for some cash [as bedel]. If the 
wound becomes aggravated and leads to some other sickness, can Hind rescind the 
mentioned settlement? Answer: No.
331
     
 
 
This is a case of domestic violence and the settlement is made for an injury 
caused by the husband‟s punching in the wife‟s chin. Nothing is mentioned about a 
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broken bone or peeled skin; therefore the settlement made can not be for diyet, but for 
tazir. As the entire fatwa shows, there is no difference in the ruling between the 
settlements for diyet and tazir: in both cases, if the settlement is made merely for the 
immediate injury, the ensuing consequences will be under the attacker‟s responsibility.       
 
 
 
B. Conclusion 
 
 
  
An overview of the sulh chapters of the şeyhülislam compilations under study, 
Halebi‟s Mülteka’l-Ebhur, and the earlier Hanafi legal texts helps us in understanding 
the evolution of law over centuries. The evidence at hand shows a high degree of 
consistency among the mentioned legal texts. However, they are not identical: Halebi 
appears to have stood closer to the earlier jurists than did the eighteenth-century 
şeyhülislams. For example, he defended the same position as the earlier jurists on the 
issue of conditional release. The eighteenth-century şeyhülislams, however, could 
deviate from the Hanafi regulations, as seen in their position regarding this issue. One 
other point of divergence was that of settlement upon denial, an account of which has 
been provided above. On this issue, the Ottoman jurists made a preference, not in favor 
of a Hanafi jurist, but a jurist who belonged to another legal school.  
Furthermore, Halebi and the eighteenth-century şeyhülislams differed in their 
attitude towards issues upon which the three prominent Hanafi imams had different 
ideas. While Halebi did not take side and only presented the existing different views, the 
eighteenth-century şeyhülislams studied here usually took side in accordance with the 
hierarchy mentioned by Peters, i.e. close to the original position of Abu Hanifa.
332
 This 
form of ictihâd, i.e. legal reasoning of individual jurists, eliminating uncertainties can be 
a sign of further standardization of Islamic law by the Ottoman jurists, which can also 
be observed in the high degree of consistency among the fatwas of these 
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şeyhülislams.333 This standardization and homogeneity in legal principles, as long as the 
judges followed the fatwas, may have decreased the personal discretion of the judges.      
İctihâd does not take place through preference alone. The şeyhülislams under 
study also used analogy as a tool to rule about new issues, as is the case with tapu.
334
 
Another way through which the ictihâd of the Ottoman jurists can be observed is their 
decisions on grey areas of the law, i.e. areas where a crime exists but does not fall in a 
category of crime that is well-defined by the sharia.
335
 The şeyhülislams‟ maneuver in 
these areas may have limited, at least theoretically, the extent of the judges‟ judicial 
discretion. Among the actions proclaimed as crimes to be punished by tazir, many 
forms of physical abuse and cursing can be mentioned.
336
 This concern of the Ottoman 
jurists to formulate legal principles can be explained in the context of seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries when the Ottoman polity was getting further bureaucratized and 
centralized.
337
 With the establishment of the office of fetvahane, fatwas became the 
main source of law-making for the Ottoman polity. Further expansion of the sharia to 
cover more aspects of every-day life of the Ottoman subjects would have resulted in 
more extensive state control over the individuals through applying the legal 
principles.
338
      
These examples of ictihâd in the fatwa compilations should be evaluated in light 
of the discussion on the “closure of the gate of ictihâd.” The Muslim jurists‟ claim that 
in the tenth century, ictihâd came to an end formed the basis for some scholars to argue 
for stagnation in Islamic legal systems.
339
 This view has been criticized by Rudolph 
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Peters
340
 and Wael Hallaq,
341
 who showed that there was an unbroken chain of 
prominent Muslim jurists who stood for the right to exercise ictihâd. These two authors, 
however, have been criticized by Johansen for neglecting the process of change in 
actual legal ordinances and focusing exclusively on this claim for the continuous 
existence of ictihâd.342 According to Johansen, this might beget the danger of 
“identifying the jurists‟ claim to the right of ijtihâd with their capacity to effectively 
change the legal doctrine.”343 To be able to trace the changes in the legal doctrine, other 
legal genres, including fatwas, should be taken into consideration. According to 
Johansen, the contribution of the muftis to the evolution of legal principles took place in 
two ways: 1) They had to make a choice from among different legal opinions of 
previous Muslim jurists, 2) They issued fatwas that did not reflect the views of any 
earlier jurist, but were based merely on their personal authority.
344
 The compilations 
studied here contain good examples of both ways of contribution to the changes in legal 
principles.        
The fatwa material depicts a picture of the Ottoman society as it was (meant to 
be) regulated by the legal principles. Emphasis on the rights and obligations of the 
individual is of primary concern in the fatwas. A good example for the preservation of 
individual rights is the attitude of the Ottoman şeyhülislams regarding the cases of 
settlement upon denial. It demonstrates vividly the significance attributed by the 
Ottoman jurists to evidence, hence, not jeopardizing the rights of individuals for the 
sake of social harmony.
345
 
                                                 
340
 Rudolph Peters, 1984 “Ijtihâd and Taqlîd in 18th and 19th Century Islam” Die Welt 
des Islams, 20 (3/4), pp. 131-145. 
341
 Wael Hallaq, “Was the Gate of Ijtihad Closed?”   
342
 Baber Johansen, “Legal Literature and the Problem of Change: The Case of Land 
Rent,” in his Contingency in Sacred Law, 1999, p.447. 
343
 Johansen, “Legal Literature,” p.447. 
344
 Johansen, “Legal Literature,” p.447. pp.447-453. Kürşad U. Akpınar‟s findings 
support the idea that fatwas functioned as a medium of change and development in law 
after the so-called closure of the gate of ictihad, “İltizam in the Fetvas of Ottoman 
Şeyhülislams,” p.72.  
345
 Ottoman muftis encouraged the plaintiffs to raise the same claim also in the court 
more than one time in case they have further evidence. Johansen, “Legal Literature,” 
p.451.  
71 
 
An important indicator of the emphasis put on individual obligation by the 
Ottoman jurists is absence of ‘âkıle (communal group) in the fatwas related to the diyet 
for homicide. ‘Âkıle is defined as a group of people such as kins (‘asabe), tribe, 
members of the same payroll in the early Islamic state (dîvân), and occupational groups 
who pay the bloodmoney for unintentional homicide.
346
 Although the communal group 
did not have a specific definition, the fundamental criterion for the formation of an 
‘âkıle was the existence of solidarity within that group, so that members of the same 
garrison, the same village, or the same neighborhood were also taken as the communal 
group by the earlier Hanafi jurists of different times.
 347
 In the Ottoman legal system, 
however, ‘âkıle did not have a place, as explicitly stated by a fatwa of Ebu‟s-su„ûd 
(1490-1574):  
 
“When a killer cannot pay, is his communal group (‘aqila) liable for blood-
money? Answer: There are no ‘aqila in these lands.”348  
 
However, it should be noted that a type of communal responsibility existed in 
the fatwa compilations: kasâme, which is defined as communal compurgation and 
payment of bloodmoney for a person found slain in a quarter or village.
349
 This 
communal responsibility survived in the texts of the Ottoman jurists, perhaps, out of 
necessity, where no individual was found to be responsible.   
Halebi, a contemporary of Ebu‟s-su„ûd, refered to ‘âkıle in different parts of 
Mülteka.350 Such a difference of view on this issue might be a sign of the lower degree 
of standardization in the sixteenth century compared to the eighteenth century. Another 
explanation might be the difference in the careers of these two sixteenth-century jurists. 
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While Halebi has devoted his life to learn and teach Islamic law,
351
 Ebu‟s-su„ûd had 
additional official duties, serving as the judge of Bursa and Istanbul, the Military Judge 
of Rumelia and, for about three decades, as şeyhülislam.352 The political career of 
Ebu‟s-su„ûd may have been a reason for his taking into consideration the current 
situation and social changes of the society which rendered some legal principles 
incompatible with the realities of the society. The process of urbanization decreased the 
importance of tribes and clans, at least in the cities and towns. The increase of economic 
transactions conducted by individual proprietors
353
 had led to rise of the notion of 
individual as opposed to social embeddedness.
354
 Whether law was the leading factor in 
creating the individual proprietor or the rise in economic contracts among individuals 
led to the relevant formulation in law is a question whose answer is beyond the scope of 
this study. However, it seems reasonable to suggest the existence of a symbiotic 
relationship and mutual influence between the two.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 
This thesis depicts an extra-court, but at the same time legal mechanism of 
dispute settlement as demonstrated in the sulh chapters of three eighteenth-century 
Ottoman fatwa compilations. However, the question of legal continuity has been 
another driving force behind throughout this study. The continuity between legal 
principles in classical Hanafi texts, and those by prominent Ottoman jurists of the 
sixteenth and eighteenth centuries has been questioned in light of secondary literature. 
In both chapters, this question was borne in mind: Did the Ottoman jurists follow 
exactly the legal principles put forward by the classical Hanafi jurists? If not, was there 
any general logic behind their deviation from earlier Hanafi texts? The answer to these 
questions has implications in the fields of Ottoman law and Islamic law. Especially, it is 
directly related to the debate on the “closure of the gate of ictihâd.”  
In the first chapter, a detailed account of the legal principles surrounding sulh in 
Islamic and Ottoman law was presented not only for the sake of comparison answering 
the question of legal continuity, but also to show the Ottoman and Hanafi law‟s attitude 
towards the negotiation of the individuals to settle their own disputes. In the first 
chapter, it was shown that while Islamic and Ottoman law had a positive attitude 
towards the settlement of disputes in the community without recourse to the court, it did 
not leave this field totally in the hands and initiative of the individuals. In contrast, the 
limits of individuals‟ legal activities were precisely defined by the law. After all, the 
sulh is perceived as a contract. Although there is not a theory of sulh contract,
355
 the law 
regarding similar contracts is applied to sulh as well. For example, if a sulh contract is 
similar to a sale, it follows the regulations of sale contract. In this context, this study is 
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presenting further evidence in the history of Islamic dispute settlement, which might be 
used, in the debates regarding Weber‟s „kadijustiz‟, at least in the Ottoman context.    
One important contribution of the first chapter was clarification of the legalistic 
attitude of the Islamic/Ottoman law towards dispute settlement. This legalistic attitude 
did not necessitate the settlement of the disputes in the court; instead, it provided a very 
well-defined ground on which the individual could act as a legal person, in line with the 
general attitude of Islamic law towards the rights and responsibilities of individuals vis-
à-vis one another. In this respect, there is a need to re-evaluate the attempts to situate the 
attitude of Islamic/Ottoman law towards unofficial acts of dispute settlement in one of 
the dual categories, e.g. Court Model vs. Bargain Model, provided by students of legal 
anthropology and conflict resolution. Not being in the Court Model does not situate 
Islamic legal practice, as can be observed in the practice of settlement contract, in the 
Bargain Model.   
In the first chapter, an effort has been made to modify the meaning of the 
concept of sulh as perceived by the students of conflict resolution in Islamic contexts. 
These scholars present a description of sulh as a ritualistic process of mediation and an 
indigenous method of alternative dispute resolution (ADR.) Their normative concern 
regarding the proof of the existence of such indigenous mechanisms and, therefore, the 
futility of blind application of western mechanisms in the Middle Eastern societies has 
led these scholars to broad generalizations, reflecting some Orientalist stereotypes about 
Muslim societies, such as the absence of the notion of individualism or low significance 
attached to systematic legal codification, if at all. The data at hand can be used to 
present a critique of such generalizations: the pre-Modern Ottoman society was seen by 
jurists as an amalgamation of individuals with rights and responsibilities towards one 
another, and these rights and responsibilities could not be disregarded for the sake of 
social harmony.  
The second chapter has presented a thematic picture of the fatwas in the sulh 
chapter of the compilations. It has been observed that most of the cases were related to 
debt disputes, an overwhelming majority of which were cash-based. The debt disputes 
were followed by inheritance, homicide, and bodily harm. These legal disputes fall in 
the category of hukûk’ul-‘ibâd, i.e. the private “claims of men.” In Ottoman/Islamic 
75 
 
law, private law not only covers laws regarding transactions, family, and inheritance, 
but also parts of penal law, namely those related to homicide and injury.
356
        
This chapter has also tried to answer the question of continuity within Ottoman 
legal thought on the one hand and between the earlier Hanafi law and the Ottoman law 
on the other. A high degree of consistency has been observed between the texts of the 
Ottoman jurists and those of the earlier Hanafi texts. However, there are some points of 
deviation and innovation in the Ottoman legal texts that need to be analyzed. This 
observation is in line with Hallaq and Johansen‟s argument that in the post-classical 
period, necessary changes in Islamic law came through fatwas.
357
 The relevant findings 
in the current study, first, are useful to see the change in legal principles from the 
sixteenth to the eighteenth century. It sheds further light on the debate regarding the 
“closure of the gate of ictihâd.” Secondly, the direction of change in the legal principles 
shows that Ottoman jurists of the eighteenth century paid closer attention to the legal 
personality of the individuals and establishment of legal rights and obligations through 
exploitation of all possible evidence. The preservation of the rights of proprietors forms 
the basis of the Hanafi private law,
358
 an attitude which was furthered by the Ottoman 
jurists: in cases where there was a kind of trade-off between social harmony and the 
rights and obligations of the individual proprietor, the Ottoman jurists opted for the 
protection of the latter.  
Another observation in the second chapter was a high degree of homogeneity 
among the fatwas of different Ottoman jurists of eighteenth century. Does it mean that 
in the eighteenth century Ottoman law as a whole was in the process of standardization? 
The findings of this study are not sufficient to answer this question. Canbakal states that 
looking for fatwas in the local courts may be a good method to trace legal integration.
359
 
Another way would be looking for parallelism between the legal decisions of the local 
judges and the principles in the compilations. This takes us to the broader discussion of 
the relationship between theory and practice.           
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Legal Practice: 
 
 
 
The material used in this thesis, namely Halebi‟s Mülteka and the three fatwa 
compilations of the eighteenth-century şeyhülislams, present an account of the legal 
principles that were meant to guide the practice of settlement. However, the important 
question to be asked here is the degree of consistency between these legal principles on 
the one hand and the everyday legal practice on the other. It is well-known that Mülteka 
was a handbook used widely by judges and muftis in the Ottoman lands. It has been 
argued that fatwa compilations were taken seriously into consideration by the judges, at 
least in the central parts of the empire.
360
 Furthermore, these compilations were also 
used as legal handbooks for the judges,
361
 since fatwas “are meant to be religious 
guidance in everyday life.”362 The role of fatwas in legal practice was not confined to 
constructing a legal base for judges. Fatwas were used as an independent tool of dispute 
settlement as well.
363
 Therefore, it seems reasonable to state that the material used in 
this study had direct implications for legal practice as well.  
However, it should be noted that the material at hand reflects the legal principles 
produced at the center of the empire. Therefore, further studies on local muftis would 
assist us to delineate a more comprehensive picture of the Ottoman legal principles. 
Comparative studies are necessary not only to compare şeyhülislams with local muftis, 
but also the local muftis among themeselves. Yaycıoğlu in his scrutiny of two 
biographical works by „Atâ„î and Şeyhî, in seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
respectively, finds out that muftis of Arab provinces, except Aleppo, are not mentioned. 
He concludes that the muftis of those provinces may not be a part of Ottoman official 
learned hierarchy.
364
 The degree to which non-official muftis adhere to the legal 
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principles produced by the central jurists might be another question tu pursue, to be 
followed by another one regarding the role of those provincial muftis in the legal 
practice.        
In this regard, it is necessary to note that further studies based on the court 
registers
365
 are needed in order to ascertain the degree of compatibility between the 
doctrines laid out by the muftis and the actual legal practice in the courts during the 
same period. Such an examination should not be confined to identifying the actual usage 
of fatwas in the courts. Therefore, students of Ottoman law should be sufficiently 
knowledgeable in legal principles in order to look for and identify the degree of 
compatibility between legal theory and practice also in records of cases where there is 
no reference to fatwas. Since the actual presentation of, or explicit reference to fatwas in 
court registers was relatively infrequent, knowledge of legal principles helps the 
students of Ottoman law to look within the court registers for relevant information to 
test the degree of consistency of legal theory and practice.
366
 Among the functions of 
the Ottoman court was notary activities, which involved certification of already existing 
contracts among the individuals. For the same reason, settlement cases can be found in 
the court registers.
367
 Ramazanoğlu observes a high degree of overlap between the legal 
principles put forward by classical Hanafi jurists and the legal practice in the Ottoman 
context.
368
 The same is true with Heyd‟s study on Bursa court registers. Unlike the 
eighteenth-century Trabzon sicils, however, the sixteenth-century Bursa sicils involve 
records of extra-sharia fines imposed by kanûn, even in cases of settlement for 
homicide.
369
      
The necessity of cross-reading the topic of sulh is emphasized by Aida Othman 
as well. On the one hand, without the court registers, it is very difficult to establish the 
                                                 
365
 Abdullah Ramazanoğlu‟s “Şer‟yye Sicili ve Sulh Akdi” is a good example of a study 
which presents the cases of settlement as they appeared in the court registers of Trabzon 
in the early eighteenth century. For usage of fatwas in Ankara courts in late 16
th
 and 
early 17
th
 centuries see Ali Yaycıoğlu, “Ottoman Fatwâ,” pp.104-132. 
366
 A good example is Gerber‟s study, State, Society, and Law in Islam.   
367
 All of the settlement cases in Ramazanoğlu emerge in the courts for the sake of 
certification. The disputants in those cases did not use the court, for example, in order to 
seek the support of the court to settle their disputes. Ramazanoğlu, “Şer‟yye Sicili ve 
Sulh Akdi,”  p.15.   
368
 Ramazanoğlu, “Şer‟yye Sicili ve Sulh Akdi,” p.89. 
369
 Heyd, Studies in Old Ottoman Criminal Law, pp.247-250. 
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link between the legal principles and legal practice. On the other hand, a study on the 
concept of sulh, not informed by the legal principles, might mislead one to the 
conclusion that sulh is an extra-legal mechanism of dispute resolution in Ottoman 
society.
370
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 Othman, “Sulh is Best,” p.205.  
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